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RECONCEIVING CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
Elizabeth Pollman*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United v. FEC1 put in sharp
relief the public’s concern about the scope of corporate constitutional rights and
the disconnect between protecting corporations and protecting people. Few
decisions have been the subject of such immediate and widespread public
disapproval. Subsequently, commentators and scholars have treated the First
Amendment speech2 and campaign finance3 aspects of the case extensively, and
others have addressed related concerns regarding corporate governance,4 corporate
criminal liability, 5 and various other matters. 6 This Article breaks from those
approaches. It does not focus primarily on Citizens United. Instead, this Article
examines the origins of corporations as right holders—the doctrine of corporate
*

© 2011 Elizabeth Pollman, Law Fellow, Stanford Law School, Rock Center for
Corporate Governance, Stanford University. My sincere thanks to Michael Klausner,
Richard Craswell, Norman Spaulding, Larry Ribstein, Jordan Barry, Peter Conti-Brown,
Peter Linzer, Gowri Ramachandran, Ryan Calo, Samuel Bray, Nick Stephanopoulos,
Jeanne Merino, Deepa Varadarajan, Andrea Roth, Shirin Sinnar, and participants at fellows
workshops at Stanford Law School for helpful suggestions and comments.
1
Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2
See, e.g., Deborah Hellman, Money Talks But It Isn’t Speech, 95 MINN. L. REV. 953
(2011); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Two Concepts of Freedom of Speech, 124 HARV. L. REV.
143 (2010); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV. 1025 (2011);
Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens
United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365 (2010).
3
See, e.g., Richard L. Hasen, Citizens United and the Illusion of Coherence, 109
MICH. L. REV. 581 (2011); Samuel Issacharoff, On Political Corruption, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 118 (2010); Michael S. Kang, The End of Campaign Finance Law, 98 VA. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2012).
4
See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010
WIS. L. REV. 999; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson, Jr., Corporate Political
Speech: Who Decides?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 83 (2010); Elizabeth Pollman, Citizens Not
United: The Lack of Stockholder Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech, 119 YALE
L.J. ONLINE 53 (2009).
5
See, e.g., Elizabeth R. Sheyn, The Humanization of the Corporate Entity: Changing
Views of Corporate Criminal Liability in the Wake of Citizens United, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1 (2010).
6
See, e.g., Bert Brandenburg, Big Money and Impartial Justice: Can They Live
Together?, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (2010); Adam Liptak, Caperton After Citizens United, 52
ARIZ. L. REV. 203 (2010); Toni M. Massaro, Foreign Nationals, Electoral Spending, and
the First Amendment, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 663 (2011); Paul M. Secunda,
Addressing Political Captive Audience Workplace Meetings in the Post-Citizens United
Environment, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 17 (2010).
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personhood—and offers an alternative approach to determining the scope of
corporate rights.
Specifically, this Article traces historical and theoretical developments in the
corporation and corporate personhood jurisprudence to show that the roots of the
doctrine are based in concerns about the property and contract interests of
shareholders. Over time, however, the Court expanded the doctrine without a
coherent explanation or consistent approach. It recognized corporations as subject
to criminal liability and expanded the scope of corporate rights to include a
patchwork of rights related to searches and trials. And, the Court recognized
corporations as having commercial and political speech rights.
But the conceptions of the corporation the Court has used in its ad hoc
dispensation of rights are substantively flawed and incomplete. Moreover,
oscillating between these conceptions demonstrates the weakness of this approach.
Viewing the corporation as a concession from the state is a relic of a time before
incorporating became a mere administrative formality. Likewise, viewing the
corporation as just an aggregate of its shareholders can be incongruent with
modern times, particularly in the large public company context. Shareholders in
publicly traded corporations are not a static set of identifiable human actors and
they do not control day-to-day corporate decision-making. Conceiving of the
corporation as a real entity, more than a legal fiction or the sum of its shareholders,
does not explain why corporations would receive constitutional protections as
people.
Taking account of the doctrine’s roots and its expansions, this Article argues
that corporate personhood should be understood as merely recognizing the
corporation’s ability to hold rights in order to protect the people involved.7 This
concept is the only common thread in the case law. But that concept alone does not
speak to whether corporations should have a particular right; it only provides a
7
For different arguments about corporate personhood jurisprudence and its
implications, see HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE CORPORATION AND THE
CONSTITUTION viii (1995) (arguing that the proper application of the Constitution to the
corporation is as a set of private contractual relationships and that “[a]cceptance of this
analysis should lead to broader constitutional protection” for the corporation); THOM
HARTMANN, UNEQUAL PROTECTION: THE RISE OF CORPORATE DOMINANCE AND THE
THEFT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2002) (a progressive, historical perspective arguing that
corporations have been trying to “steal” rights through corporate personhood and dominate
our democracy, and proposing legal reform such as constitutional amendment); Carl J.
Mayer, Personalizing the Impersonal: Corporations and the Bill of Rights, 41 HASTINGS
L.J. 577 (1990) (arguing that the Supreme Court lacks a defensible theory for corporate
personhood and proposing a constitutional amendment establishing a presumption favoring
the individual over the corporation); Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A
Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP.
& FIN. L. 97 (2009) (arguing for an interdisciplinary view of corporations); Dale Rubin,
Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant
Corporations Constitutional Rights Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523
(2010) (arguing that Bill of Rights protections were created only for individuals and not for
corporations).
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starting point of analysis—the notion that it is possible for corporations to hold
rights. Furthermore, a metaphor or philosophical conception of the corporation is
not helpful for the type of functional analysis that the Court should conduct. The
Court should consider the purpose of the constitutional right at issue, and whether
it would promote the objectives of that right to provide it to the corporation—and
thereby to the people underlying the corporation.
In contrast to the Court’s ad hoc approach to corporate rights, this Article’s
alternative approach would offer the advantage of increased judicial legitimacy and
transparency. This approach would use a coherent test consistent with the
objectives of the underlying rights as well as the realities and dynamics of the
modern business corporation. It does not provide a grand theory of constitutional
interpretation nor does it prescribe a particular theory of the corporation. Rather, it
more modestly asserts that the Court should similarly approach questions of
corporate rights, cognizant of the pragmatic assertion of American philosopher
John Dewey that the facts and relations involved should be faced and stated in the
process.8
This Article begins by examining the development of corporations and
corporate personhood theories in early America and the nineteenth century. This
historical and theoretical background provides critical insight into the narrow
property and contract context in which the Court first established its view of the
corporation as a person for constitutional purposes. Part III then shows how the
Court continued to rely on the corporate-person metaphor in expanding corporate
liability and rights beyond the doctrine’s roots without regard to the limited
explanatory power of the earlier jurisprudence or the changed nature of the modern
business corporation. Part IV explains the limitations of the Court’s conceptions of
the corporation in this jurisprudence. Having established the roots of the doctrine
and its ungrounded expansions, Part V critically examines substitutes for the
corporate-person metaphor and suggests an alternative approach to determining the
scope of corporate rights.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CORPORATION AND CORPORATE PERSONHOOD
GROUNDED IN PROTECTING INDIVIDUALS’ PROPERTY AND CONTRACT INTERESTS
This section examines the development of corporations and corporate
personhood in early America and the nineteenth century to introduce the context in
which the Court first established its view of the corporation as a person for
constitutional purposes. This shows the limited purview of the corporate
personhood doctrine and its grounding in protecting individuals’ property and
contract interests.
It should be noted at the outset, however, that we did not create the corporate
form or the corporate-person metaphor; we inherited and transformed them. Some
trace the origins of the corporate form to ancient Rome, and more definitively, to
8

John Dewey, The Historical Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE
L.J. 655, 672–73 (1926).
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medieval Europe when churches, guilds, and local governments sought royal
authority to incorporate entities for perpetual survival. 9 By the late sixteenth
century, several European countries had begun chartering corporations to develop
foreign trade and colonies.10 Some of these early corporations, such as the East
India Company and the Hudson Bay Company, became well-known players in
American colonial times.11 English law used the metaphor of the corporation as a
person to describe the self-perpetuating nature of the corporation.12
A. The Corporation in Early America
Although corporations were known in American colonial times, the
Constitution itself includes no specific reference to corporations. 13 Corporate
history in early America remains somewhat murky and subject to debate. The
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Citizens United illustrates this with Justice
Scalia’s concurrence and Justice Stevens’ dissent presenting opposing views about
whether the Framers disliked corporations, and more fundamentally, about the
perceived role of corporations during this period.14
9

See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 1780–1970, at 1–3 (1970); David F. Linowes, The
Corporation as Citizen, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS, AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 345 (A. E. Dick Howard ed., 1992).
10
See HURST, supra note 9, at 4.
11
See id. at 7; Linowes, supra note 9, at 345.
12
For example, Blackstone noted that when members “are consolidated and united
into a corporation, they and their successors are then considered as one person in law: as
one person, they have one will, which is collected from the sense of the majority of the
individuals . . . for all the individual members that have existed from the foundation to the
present time, or that shall ever hereafter exist, are but one person in law, a person that never
dies . . . .” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 468 (7th ed. 1775).
13
HURST, supra note 9, at 113–15.
14
See 130 S. Ct. 876, 925–29 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring); cf. id. at 929–79
(Stevens, J., dissenting). On re-argument, the case concerned the constitutionality of
section 203 of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), prohibiting
corporations and unions from using general treasury funds for independent expenditures
advocating for or against candidates in certain federal elections within a certain number of
days of those elections. Id. at 887. Justice Stevens dissented on multiple grounds, including
on the basis that the majority opinion overruled cases that were not inconsistent with “our
First Amendment tradition” and “original understandings . . . .” Id. at 948. Relying on
sources by historians and legal academics, Justice Stevens argued that the Framers
“conceived of speech more narrowly than we now think of it,” and understood corporations
as being subject to “comprehensive[] regulat[ion] in the service of public welfare.” Id. at
948–50. Justice Scalia concurred separately to respond to the dissent, and argued that the
“text offers no foothold for excluding any category of speaker” and that “the dissent offers
no evidence about the original meaning of the text to support any such exclusion.” Id. at
929. Specifically, Justice Scalia asserted that although the number of corporations in
America by the end of the eighteenth century seems small, the corporation was “a familiar
figure in American economic life” and it is unclear that corporations were “despised” and
THE
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Notwithstanding some debate about the role and view of corporations in early
America, scholars agree that before independence there were only a small handful
of corporations. 15 Most businesses were organized as sole proprietorships and
partnerships rather than as corporations.16 After independence, royal charter was
no longer required for incorporation; that authority subsequently resided in each
state.17 By the end of the eighteenth century, the number of corporations increased
to around 300. 18 As discussed further below, the great majority of these
corporations engaged in quasi-public activities such as infrastructure building,
while only a small fraction engaged in general commerce. 19 The corporate
landscape therefore looked much different from today’s.
B. The Corporation as a Special Privilege or Concession of the State
By the early part of the nineteenth century, although the number had increased
since independence, there were still relatively few corporations.20 State legislatures
controlled the authority for businesses to incorporate and before the 1850s,
typically granted charters only by special order on an individual basis. 21
that even if they were that the Framers would have excluded them from the First
Amendment. Id. at 925–26. Justice Scalia purported to show that the “lack of a textual
exception for speech by corporations cannot be explained on the ground that such
organizations did not exist or did not speak” with examples of political speech by a
religious corporation and two political advocacy corporations. Id. at 926–27. He did not
provide any examples of early corporate political expenditures by business corporations.
15
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 188–89 (2d ed. 1985);
HURST, supra note 9, at 7, 14.
16
See Linowes, supra note 9, at 346 (explaining that “[m]erchants at that time had
limited need for the advantages of incorporation, preferring more immediate and exclusive
control of their businesses”); see also ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 1 (1986);
Margaret M. Blair, Locking In Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business
Organizers in the Nineteenth Century, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 414 (2003).
17
Kathleen F. Brickey, Corporate Criminal Accountability: A Brief History and an
Observation, 60 WASH. U. L.Q. 393, 404 (1982).
18
FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at 188–89 (“In all of the 18th century, charters were
issued to only 335 businesses. Only seven of these were during the colonial period; 181
were issued between 1796 and 1800.”); HURST, supra note 9, at 14 (“After independence
the desire of businessmen to use the corporation mounted rapidly; state legislatures
chartered 317 business corporations from 1780 to 1801.”).
19
HURST, supra note 9, at 17 (“Of the 317 separate-enterprise special charters enacted
from 1780 to 1801 in the states . . . less than 4 per cent were for general business
corporations.”); Brickey, supra note 17, at 404 (“Of the 225 private corporate charters
granted prior to 1800, fewer than a third were issued to enterprises whose purpose was to
engage in general commercial activity.”).
20
See Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller, Introduction to CORPORATIONS AND
SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 2 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds.,
1987) (“Only approximately 300 corporations, each comparatively small in size, were
present as late as 1800.”).
21
See HURST, supra note 9, at 15; see also Linowes, supra note 9, at 346.

1634

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

Corporations were generally viewed as enterprises owing their existence to the
state because their authority to conduct business in corporate form flowed from a
state-granted charter.22
As a special government “privilege” or “grant,” states mainly awarded
charters for enterprises that would benefit the public good, such as for building
public works like bridges and supplying public transport like operating a ferry.23 In
this sense, most corporations were “quasi-public.” 24 The corporate form was
particularly well suited to developing these capital-intensive, large-scale
businesses.25 By incorporating, companies could obtain large amounts of capital
while limiting investors’ participation in management. 26 And unlike a sole
proprietorship or a partnership, shareholders of a corporation have limited liability
for the corporation’s debts—meaning that their losses cannot exceed the amount
they paid for their shares.27

22

HURST, supra note 9, at 17; see also Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 518 (1819) (discussed infra notes 34–42).
23
See HURST, supra note 9, at 15, 17; MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION
OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 72–73 (1992).
24
Blair, supra note 16, at 428. Blair explained:
The distinction between these early civic, religious, and charitable
corporations and some of the earliest business corporations may not have been
obvious. . . . Both types were also intended to serve a broad, quasi-public
purpose. . . . In fact, many of these businesses might more appropriately be
regarded as public works projects, which the states did not want to have to use
their taxing authority to finance. Often they were highly risky enterprises, which
not infrequently failed to earn any profits at all. And even when the businesses
were able to earn a profit, it was not uncommon that the assets of the business,
including the special franchise they had, would revert to the government after
some specified period of time.
Id.

25

Id. at 427–28; see also Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Partnerships, Corporations, and the
Limits on Contractual Freedom in U.S. History: An Essay in Economics, Law, and Culture,
in CONSTRUCTING CORPORATE AMERICA: HISTORY, POLITICS, CULTURE 29 (Kenneth
Lipartito & David B. Sicilia eds., 2004) (“There is general consensus that, by the end of the
nineteenth century, corporations were critical to the task of mobilizing capital for largescale industry.”).
26
See Blair, supra note 16, at 393.
27
In the nineteenth century, there was some variation as limited liability gained
acceptance. CLARK, supra note 16, at 7; see also PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW: THE SEARCH FOR A NEW
CORPORATE PERSONALITY 3–20 (1993) (discussing general American acceptance of
limited liability by early nineteenth century but noting that some states allowed for liability
up to double or triple the original capital subscription); HURST, supra note 9, at 27–28
(noting a presumption of corporate limited liability existed until the middle to late part of
the nineteenth century when statutes clarified this status).
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In addition to requiring a special charter, states also subjected corporations to
various limitations, such as on the number of shareholders, capitalization, and life
term.28 Further, special charters and early legislation required that the corporate
charters define a limiting purpose or field of operation for the business.29 Early
case law, known as the “ultra vires” doctrine, held corporations to actions inside
these formal, delineated corporate powers and imposed consequences on actions
outside of these powers.30 Thus, in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth
century, corporations were organized with a quasi-public function and were
understood to be subject to strict government limitations.31
This view of corporations, as creatures of the state, artificial beings having
only those rights explicitly granted to them, is often called the “concession”
theory. 32 Under this view the corporation is a legal fiction and incorporation a
special privilege or concession awarded by the state. Accordingly, this view
supported the government-imposed limitations on corporations of the time because
if incorporation is a state grant, it follows that it can be a limited one.
In many respects, the Court developed its personification of the corporation
during this early period of corporate development. The context for these cases
involved questions of property and contract. The well-known case, Trustees of
Dartmouth College v. Woodward,33 illustrates how the concession theory animated
the Supreme Court’s early view of the corporation and its early jurisprudence using
the person metaphor to protect property and contract interests.34
In Dartmouth College, the Supreme Court held that the state could not
unilaterally amend the charter of a private college and effectively convert it into a
public institution.35 Viewing the corporate charter as a contract with the state, the
28

See HURST, supra note 9, at 45–47, 157.
Id. at 44.
30
Id. at 157. For a discussion of the rise and fall of the ultra vires doctrine, see Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes
on How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279,
1302–13 (2001).
31
HURST, supra note 9, at 17; see also Samuel Williston, History of the Law of
Business Corporations Before 1800, 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 110 (1888) (“But the
corporation was far from being regarded as simply an organization for the more convenient
prosecution of business. It was looked on as a public agency . . . .”).
32
This notion also goes by the name of variant theories like the artificial entity,
creature, grant, or fiction theory. See Dewey, supra note 8, at 665–68 (explaining some of
the finer intricacies of these theories and noting differences between ones often lumped
together such as the fiction theory and concession theory).
33
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
34
See id. at 636–39. Dartmouth College did not involve a business corporation, but
commentators have noted its primary significance is with regard to business corporations.
HURST, supra note 9, at 63; WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., BUSINESS
ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 113–14 (10th ed. 2007);
Tamara R. Piety, Against Freedom of Commercial Expression, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2583,
2621 n.175 (2008).
35
17 U.S. at 650.
29
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Court struck down a statute attempting to change the charter as a violation of the
Contracts Clause of the Constitution, which forbids a state from passing a bill
impairing a contractual obligation.36
The Court first drew a distinction between a state legislature’s ability to act
with regard to a public versus a private entity, emphasizing that Dartmouth College
was private because its funds derived from private donations and neither its
educational activities nor its incorporation changed its private character. 37
According to the Court, a corporation has only the attributes that its charter
bestows upon it. In this case the corporation was chartered for private purposes,
and would be protected as a private contract.38
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall famously explained that a
corporation is “an artificial being, invisible, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law.”39 As “the mere creature of law,” the corporation has only
the properties conferred by its charter, including “immortality” and
“individuality.” 40 Incorporation does not change the private nature of the
business.41 The corporation represents the aims of the people who created it by
state charter. The decision thus recognized the corporation itself as “an artificial
being” having constitutional rights to protect the property interests of its individual
donors.42
Twenty years after this application of the Contracts Clause, the Supreme
Court declared that a corporation is not a “citizen” within the meaning of the
Constitution’s Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause in Bank of Augusta v.

36

Id. at 624–50. For later Contracts Clause cases, see Allied Structural Steel Co. v.
Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234 (1978); U.S. Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1 (1977).
37
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 629–39.
38
Id. at 636–39. States responded to Dartmouth College by reserving authority in the
state legislature to amend, change, or repeal charters it granted. HURST, supra note 9, at 63.
39
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636. Chief Justice Marshall imported from Lord
Coke the idea of a corporation as “invisible, immortal, and rest[ing] only in intendment and
consideration of the law,” Case of Sutton’s Hosp., 77 Eng. Rep. 960, 973 (1612), and from
Blackstone the idea of the corporation as an “artificial person,” BLACKSTONE, supra note
12, at 467–68. See also BLUMBERG, supra note 27, at 4–5, 7 (discussing how Chief Justice
Marshall borrowed from English characterizations of the corporation). Chief Justice
Marshall had earlier expressed this view of a corporation as a “mere creature” of the law
deriving its power only from incorporation in Head & Amory v. Providence Ins. Co., 6 U.S.
(2 Cranch) 127 (1804).
40
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636.
41
Id. Several years after Dartmouth College, in Providence Bank v. Billings, Chief
Justice Marshall reaffirmed this principle. 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 560 (1830) (“It has been
settled that a contract entered into between a state and an individual, is as fully protected by
the tenth section of the first article of the constitution, as a contract between two
individuals . . . .”).
42
Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636.
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Earle.43 The case concerned whether a bank had legal existence to enter into a
valid contract outside of the state in which it was incorporated.44 The Court noted
that in an earlier case, Bank of the United States v. Deveaux,45 it had looked to the
individuals composing a corporation to decide whether the corporation had a right
to sue in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. 46 But the Court declined to
extend this reasoning and look behind the corporation to see if its members were
all citizens of Georgia and thereby treat the corporation as entitled to the privileges
and immunities of citizens of Alabama.47
The Court expressed concern that if it were to look behind the corporation to
the aggregate of individuals, as if the corporation were a partnership, it would
undermine the rationale for corporate limited liability that was gaining acceptance
at the time.48 The Court explained:
If . . . members of a corporation were to be regarded as individuals
carrying on business in their corporate name, and therefore entitled to the
privileges of citizens in matters of contract, it is very clear that they must
at the same time take upon themselves the liabilities of citizens, and be
bound by their contracts in like manner. . . . [and] be liable to the whole
extent of [their] property for the debts of the corporation . . . .49
The Court, however, noted that states would likely recognize the charters
granted by other states as a matter of comity. This practice, the Court reasoned,
would treat the corporation as “a person, for certain purposes in contemplation of
law,” like natural persons who contract in other states and “nobody has ever
doubted the validity of these agreements.”50
Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, a corporation was not a “citizen” within
the meaning of the Article IV Privileges and Immunities Clause, but the corporate
charter was protected by the Contracts Clause, the corporation was recognized as
43

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519, 586–87 (1839). The Privileges and Immunities Clause
provides “[t]he Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of
Citizens in the several States.” U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
44
Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 585.
45
9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
46
Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 586.
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 588. The Court reaffirmed its decision that corporations are not citizens
entitled to the benefits of the Privileges and Immunities Clause in the well-known case,
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), but its later Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence undercut the impact of Bank of Augusta and Paul. See infra Part II.D.
Further, corporations’ ability to do business in other states was aided by the Court’s
indication in Paul that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce included interstate
transactions involving corporations. See KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 114 & n.9
(discussing Paul and permissive corporate enabling laws providing an environment for
interstate competition).

1638

UTAH LAW REVIEW

[NO. 4

having properties of “individuality,” and the corporation was conceived of as a
“person, for certain purposes in contemplation of law.” This protected
shareholders’ property and contract interests in the entity.51
Notably, this personification of the corporation in the constitutional sense was
different than the “legal personality” that courts, dating back to earlier English
law,52 had already recognized in giving corporations certain business capabilities.
Legal personality of corporations included the ability to contract, own property,
sue and be sued in the corporate name. Specifically, the corporate ability to own
property53 and to sue and be sued54 were considered incident to the corporate form
at common law. Courts also recognized corporations as having the ability to
contract in their own name, but historically treated this under the ultra vires
doctrine as a capacity limited by the corporate charter.55 These rights allowed the
51

For a discussion of classical corporate theory that includes an interpretation of the
early corporate personhood doctrine as the Supreme Court’s solution to two propertyrelated problems, see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1640–41 (1988) (noting the doctrine protected corporate
property like property held by an individual owner, and allowed the directors or managers,
rather than the shareholders, to assert constitutional claims to protect corporate property).
52
For example, in his 1793 Treatise on the Law of Corporations, Stewart Kyd
described a corporation as “vested by the policy of the law, with a capacity of acting, in
several respects, as an individual, particularly of taking and granting property, contracting
obligations, and of suing and being sued.” Lamoreaux, supra note 25, at 32 (quoting
STEWART KYD, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS (1793)).
53
See, e.g., Van Allen v. Assessors, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 573, 584 (1865) (quoting Lord
Denman in an older English case and referencing as established law: “[t]he corporation is
the legal owner of all of the property . . . and . . . can deal with the corporate property as
absolutely as a private individual can deal with his own”); see also CLARK, supra note 16,
at 19 (describing functions of legal personality for corporation, including the ability of a
corporation to own property in its own name).
54
See, e.g., Leggett v. N.J. Mfg. & Banking Co., 1 N.J. Eq. 541, 541 (N.J. Ch. 1832)
(“The powers of a corporation are, strictly speaking, two-fold; those that are derived from
express grant, and those that are incident and necessarily appertain to it, whether expressed
in the grant or not. The power to make by-laws, to make and use a common seal, and the
right to sue are incident to every corporation.”); 9 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 4226 (perm. ed., rev.
vol. 1999) (“The power to sue and be sued is one of the inherent powers of a corporation
and is among the incidental or implied powers that have been attributed to corporations
from the earliest period.”). But cf. Cmty. Bd. 7 of Borough of Manhattan v. Schaffer, 639
N.E.2d 1, 4 (N.Y. 1994) (corporations are creatures of statute and require statutory
authority to sue and be sued).
55
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 12, 18 (1979); 5 SAMUEL WILLISTON
& RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 9:1 (4th ed. 1993) (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12, cmt. b). For example, in Bank of Augusta v.
Earle, the Court made clear that capacity to contract had to be conferred by charter: “a
corporation can make no contracts, and do no acts either within or without the state which
creates it, except such as are authorized by its charter; and those acts must also be done, by
such officers or agents, and in such manner as the charter authorizes.” 38 U.S. at 587.
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corporation to carry on business as a legal entity separate and distinct from the
shareholders. 56 Indeed, recent scholarship has specifically examined the
importance of legal personality for providing: (1) a separation of assets between
the corporation, shareholders, managers, and creditors,57 and (2) an environment
for maintaining resources and capital in the corporation over the long term.58
Although these entity attributes do not directly implicate the doctrine of
corporate personhood,59 this section shows that early corporate personhood cases
are nonetheless akin to the concept of legal personality insofar as the constitutional
jurisprudence bolstered the corporation as a separate entity from its shareholders
and protected the property interests of the shareholders in the corporate property.
Recognizing the corporate charter as covered by the Contract Clause and the
corporation’s property as protected by the Due Process Clause stabilized the
corporate form as a viable organization for long-term private investment.
Not only was the corporation a distinct contracting party with a separate pool
of assets from its shareholders, managers and creditors, but it was also separate
from the government.60 Furthermore, the notion of legal personality is consistent
with early case law such as Dartmouth College that recognized corporations as
legal fictions having the capacities and characteristics given to them in the
corporate charter, such as “individuality.” 61 This treated the corporation, for
Contracts Clause purposes, as a contract creating a separate entity through which
people conducted business or carried out their identified objectives.
C. Trend for General Incorporation and Changing Theories
About Corporate Personality
As the personification of the corporation developed under the concession
view, such as in Dartmouth College, a movement was rising to attack the way that
56

See Bank of Augusta, 38 U.S. at 587 (“Whenever a corporation makes a contract, it
is the contract of the legal entity; of the artificial being created by the charter; and not the
contract of the individual members.”); JAMES D. COX ET AL., CORPORATIONS § 1.2, at 2–3
(1997) (“A business corporation is . . . a legal unit with a status or capacity of its own
separate from the other shareholders or members who own it. . . . The corporation holds
property, enters into contracts, executes conveyances, and conducts litigation in a legal
capacity separate and distinct from its shareholders.”).
57
REINIER R. KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 6–15 (2004). Authors Henry Hansmann and
Reinier Kraakman had earlier set out their views in The End of History for Corporate Law,
89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) [hereinafter Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History], and The
Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J. 387 (2000) [hereinafter Hansmann &
Kraakman, Organizational Law].
58
Blair, supra note 16, at 387.
59
See Hansmann & Kraakman, Organizational Law, supra note 57, at 438–39
(distinguishing the authors’ discussion of the corporation’s essential entity attributes from
the literature on the nature of the corporate legal person).
60
See id. at 392–93, 438–39.
61
See Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 636 (1819).
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corporate charters were specially granted. These attacks were based on fears about
a concentration of power and wealth as well as political corruption and
monopoly. 62 The “free incorporation” movement of the Jacksonian period
eventually triumphed in its attack on special chartering. 63 By the 1850s, many
states had enacted “enabling” corporate laws eliminating the need for legislative
action to incorporate. 64 These general incorporation laws turned the special
privilege of incorporation for purposes like public works into a mere
administrative formality. 65 By the end of the nineteenth century, general
incorporation was the norm across the states, providing simple procedures for
obtaining charters for any lawful business, including the manufacturing that fueled
the Industrial Revolution.66
The economic expansion of the time and the transition from special chartering
to general incorporation eroded the persuasiveness of the concession theory, as the
connection between a corporate charter and a state act became less significant.67
States like New Jersey and Delaware began to compete for corporate taxes and
fees by offering a liberal legal environment for incorporation.68 As the ultra vires
doctrine had flowed from the concession view of the corporation, courts began to
relax their insistence that all corporate actions be taken within the stated purpose of

62

See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73. Special charters were viewed as prone to an
undesirable concentration of power and wealth because they were understood as often
conferring monopoly privileges to conduct a certain business, such as to build or operate a
public work. KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 113–14. They were also viewed as not
generally available, as “[t]hose able to lobby state legislatures could obtain a corporate
charter, while less influential or affluent people could not.” Id. at 114. Adding fuel to the
criticisms of corporations in the mid-nineteenth century, a number of public scandals
occurred involving corporations securing political favors. FRIEDMAN, supra note 15, at
512–13.
63
See HURST, supra note 9, at 30–36 (discussing the Jacksonian period starting in the
1830s and the movement against special charters); see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73
(“Despite the Supreme Court’s continued hesitance, by 1900 the entity theory had largely
triumphed . . . .”).
64
HURST, supra note 9, at 18; Linowes, supra note 9, at 346.
65
HURST, supra note 9, at 18.
66
See id. at 37.
67
Linowes, supra note 9, at 351; see also HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–74 (“By
rendering the corporate form normal and regular, late-nineteenth-century corporate theory
shifted the presumption of corporate regulation against the state.”); HURST, supra note 9, at
135 (“In the early years special chartering reflected the habits of legal thought and the
concern with the power of organized groups which found shorthand expression in the
concession theory . . . . [n]evertheless, special corporate charters did disappear from 1870’s
on . . . .”); Piety, supra note 34, at 2621 (“[The] concept of the business corporation—as an
organization with a quasi-public function and strict regulation by government—situated the
corporation in its early days . . . .”).
68
See, e.g., KLEIN & COFFEE, JR., supra note 34, at 114; Piety, supra note 34, at
2621–22.
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the corporation. Instead, courts implied the powers necessary or proper for the
corporation’s business.69
While support for the concession view of the corporation faded, the nature of
corporate personality became one of the most prominent legal debates of the
time.70 Although the competing theories took many different names, three views
and their variants fundamentally dominated the debate.71 These theories directly
influenced the Supreme Court’s nineteenth century view of corporate personality.
The first was the concession theory discussed above, which, although on the
decline, continued to find voice.
In contrast, the second view, the “aggregate” theory, looked through the
corporate form to the individuals behind it. This view regarded the corporation as a
collection of its individual members, the shareholders.72 The theory had roots in a
view of the corporation as a partnership or contract among the shareholders.73
The third view, the “real entity” theory, was only beginning to emerge in the
late nineteenth century America. 74 Also known as the natural entity or person

69

HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 77–78; HURST, supra note 9, at 157–58; see also, e.g.,
Woods Lumber Co. v. Moore, 191 P. 905, 907–08 (Cal. 1920) (discussing the implied
powers initially held by corporations); Equitable Holding Co. v. Equitable Bldg. & Loan
Ass’n, 279 N.W. 736, 739–40 (Minn. 1938) (discussing the necessary actions of a
corporation’s business); State ex inf. McKittrick v. Gate City Optical Co., 97 S.W.2d 89, 92
(Mo. 1936) (stating that a corporation has the same rights as a person to contract); In re
German Jewish Children’s Aid, 272 N.Y.S. 540, 546 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1934) (holding that
corporations have implied powers to carry out those expressly granted).
70
Martin Wolff, On the Nature of Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494, 494 (1938)
(“Philosophers and sociologists, historians and jurists have given grave consideration to
this matter. Jurists have discussed it particularly in dealing with constitutional law,
jurisprudence, legal history, company law, contracts and torts. On the Continent the
number of jurists who attempt to grapple with this problem is so large that legal authors
may be divided into two groups: those who have written on the nature of legal persons, and
those who have not yet done so.”); see also Gregory A. Mark, Comment, The
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441,
1464–67 (1987) (discussing the modern development of a corporation’s legal personality in
the United States).
71
The terminology for these theories can be confusing because commentators and
jurists have sometimes used the terms interchangeably, separately, or inconsistently and
there are many variations on the theories. See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 72–74; Mayer,
supra note 7; David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 201–02
(1990).
72
Mark, supra note 70, at 1457–59; see also ROBERT HESSON, IN DEFENSE OF THE
CORPORATION xv (1979) (stating that “a corporation is in fact an association of individuals
who are entitled to the same rights and legal protections which apply to all other
individuals and organizations”).
73
See HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 75.
74
See id. at 70–71 (arguing that the real entity theory did not fully develop in America
until the turn of the century, after the Supreme Court’s decision in Santa Clara); see also
William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from
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theory, this view regarded the corporation as a real entity with a separate existence
from its shareholders and from the state.75 Some proponents of this view described
the corporation as greater than the sum of its parts, 76 and as existing before
recognition of law.77 This view of corporations as “real” and “natural” suggested
inherent, inviolable rights.78
D. Santa Clara: Recognizing the Corporation as a “Person”
under the Fourteenth Amendment
In the midst of this prominent debate about the nature of corporate
personality, the Court took another step in the development of its nineteenth
century corporate personhood jurisprudence. The famous, or infamous, Santa
Clara case79 marks this step, notwithstanding its unusual circumstances. The case
has come to stand for the proposition that corporations are “persons” within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Santa Clara concerned taxation of railroad property. Specifically, the case
posed the relatively mundane question whether a tax assessment was void because
the state board improperly included railroad fences that instead should have been
assessed by the local authorities.80 Alternatively, the case posed the larger question
whether California property tax laws unconstitutionally treated railroads differently
from other corporations and individuals. 81 By the time this case came to the
Supreme Court, railroad corporations had already tried unsuccessfully to get
federal courts to construe the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting corporations.82
In this case, the defendant railroads argued that a provision of the California
constitution violated the Fourteenth Amendment by providing a deduction for the
value of mortgages from property assessed for tax purposes, with the exclusion of

History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1485–91 (1989) (discussing the legal changes that
corporations underwent during the latter part of the nineteenth century).
75
HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–75.
76
Steven A. Bank, Entity Theory as Myth in the Origins of the Corporate Income Tax,
43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 447, 495 (2001).
77
See, e.g., Arthur W. Machen, Jr., Corporate Personality, 24 HARV. L. REV. 253,
261 (1911) (“A corporation exists as an objectively real entity, which any well-developed
child or normal man must perceive: the law merely recognizes and gives legal effect to the
existence of this entity.”).
78
Dewey, supra note 8, at 669.
79
Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394, 394–95 (1886).
80
Id. at 396–97, 412–14.
81
Id. at 409–11.
82
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S. 155, 160 (1876); Peik v.
Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co, 94 U.S. 164, 167–68 (1876); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul R.R. Co. v.
Ackley, 94 U.S. 179, 179 (1876); Winona & St. Peter R.R. Co. v. Blake, 94 U.S. 180, 180
(1876).
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railroad corporations. 83 The railroad corporations argued that this imposed
“unequal burdens” on them and thus denied them “equal protection of the laws.”84
John Norton Pomeroy, the railroad lawyer in the Santa Clara case,
emphasized that associations of natural persons complying with just a few
administrative formalities could organize themselves as a corporation and thus
corporations should have rights as would the individuals behind them.85 The focus
was on property rights: “The truth cannot be evaded that, for the purpose of
protecting rights, the property of all business and trading corporations IS the
property of the individual corporators.” 86 This aggregate conception of the
corporation was not so different from a partnership or an image of individuals
contracting amongst themselves. This was, however, only one aspect of his
argument as the case involved other issues and grounds upon which the Court
could base its decision.
Before oral argument, Chief Justice Waite stated:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question whether the
provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, which
forbids a State to deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws, applies to these corporations. We are all of
opinion that it does.87
The court reporter documented this comment in the headnotes to the opinion.88
The opinion itself, written by Justice Harlan, based the decision on another
ground, that the state board lacked jurisdiction to assess the value of the fences and
thus the tax assessment at issue was void. 89 The Court expressly stated in the
opinion that because it was basing its judgment on this narrow ground “it [wa]s not
necessary to consider any other questions raised by the pleadings and the facts
found by the court.”90
83

Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 409.
Id.
85
HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 69–70.
86
Id. at 70 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Argument for Defendant, San Mateo v. S.
Pac. R.R. Co., 116 U.S. 138 (1885)).
87
Santa Clara, 118 U.S. at 396.
88
Preceding the report of Chief Justice Waite’s comment, the headnotes state: “One
of the points made and discussed at length in the brief of counsel for defendants in error
was that Corporations are persons within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.” Id.
89
Id. at 416.
90
Id. Several months later, in preparing the U.S. Reports volume, the court reporter
sent a note to Chief Justice Waite asking if he had “correctly caught” the comment before
oral argument. Chief Justice Waite replied: “I think your mem. in the California Railroad
Tax cases expresses with sufficient accuracy what was said before the argument began. I
leave it with you to determine whether anything need be said about it in the report
inasmuch as we avoided meeting the constitutional question in the decision.” Letter from
84
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Subsequently, contrary to normal practice, Chief Justice Waite’s preargument pronouncement has been taken as a ruling that corporations are persons
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.91 Because the opinion does not
explicitly state this ruling or provide any discussion, reasoning, or authority related
to this issue, it is unclear on what basis this pronouncement was grounded.92
The case law leading up to Santa Clara arguably offers some insight into the
rationale for Chief Justice Waite’s pronouncement. The Court had earlier
construed the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting
recently freed slaves, not business firms.93 Not all members of the Court agreed. In
a notable dissent, Justice Field had argued for a more expansive construction of the
Fourteenth Amendment.94 Later, in related California tax cases leading up to Santa
Clara, Justice Field, while sitting on circuit, ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment
extended to all persons and that this included corporations. Recognizing
corporations as “artificial persons” consisting of “aggregations of individuals,”
Justice Field emphasized that the corporation represented individuals with property
Chief Justice Waite to Supreme Court Reporter J.C. Bancroft Davis (May 26, 1886)
(quoted in HOWARD JAY GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTITUTION 567 (1968)).
91
See infra Part II.E.
92
As might be expected, the unusual circumstances of this case have evoked
skepticism and debate. For example, a “conspiracy theory” arose that corporate lawyers on
the joint congressional committee that drafted the Fourteenth Amendment had craftily
chosen language or foreseen that “persons” would include corporations. GRAHAM, supra
note 90, at 566–68 (explaining that the conspiracy theory grew out of a Supreme Court
argument by Roscoe Conkling in 1882); John J. Flynn, The Jurisprudence of Corporate
Personhood: The Misuse of a Legal Concept, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND
RESPONSIBILITY 131, 138 (Warren J. Samuels & Arthur S. Miller eds., 1987) (explaining
that the conspiracy theory has been discounted (citing Howard Jay Graham, The
“Conspiracy Theory” of the Fourteenth Amendment, 47 YALE L.J. 371, 48 YALE L.J. 171
(1938)). Some commentators have characterized the decision as an example of how
decision-makers can misuse and manipulate legal concepts to hide underlying ideological
preferences. See, e.g., id. at 137–39 (arguing that Justice Field “saw the function of
Fourteenth Amendment personhood status for corporations . . . as a means for
implementing a laissez-faire economic policy for business interests and establishing
constitutional rights of property on an almost absolutist basis”). Many jurists and scholars
have observed that corporations made more use of the Fourteenth Amendment than the
individuals the amendment was designed to protect. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 89–90 (1938) (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing the amendment sought
to prevent racial discrimination by the states but that in the first fifty years after adoption
more than 50 percent of the cases invoking its protection involved corporations and less
than 1 percent involved the racial classes it was meant to protect); Mark Tushnet,
Corporations and Free Speech, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 256 (1982) (“Thus, the Court
converted an amendment primarily designed to protect the rights of blacks into an
amendment whose major effect, for the next seventy years, was to protect the rights of
corporations.”).
93
See cases cited supra note 82; see also Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36
(1873) (interpreting the meaning and application of the Fourteenth Amendment).
94
See Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. at 89–111 (Field, J., dissenting).
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interests.95 Even though shareholders do not own specific corporate assets, Justice
Field explained that shareholders’ interests had “an appreciable value, and is
property in a commercial sense” so that their property interests were implicated in
depriving the corporation of property or burdening it.96
E. Post-Santa Clara and Corporate Due Process Rights
If there was any question about the status of the Santa Clara pronouncement
in the court reporter’s headnotes, the Court shortly made clear that it would rely
upon it as precedent. In a number of subsequent cases, the Court recognized the
Santa Clara pronouncement and expanded the ruling to due process. The context
for these cases again involved the enjoyment and protection of property and
contract interests. The Court did not, however, provide consistent reasoning to
undergird Santa Clara in these subsequent decisions.
As a preliminary matter, two years after Santa Clara, the Court relied on the
decision and expressed the aggregate view of the corporation that Justice Field had
championed while sitting on circuit. In Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining and
Milling Co. v. Pennsylvania, 97 involving a corporation raising a Fourteenth
Amendment claim, the Court explained:
Such corporations are merely associations of individuals united for a
special purpose, and permitted to do business under a particular name,
and have a succession of members without dissolution. . . . The equal
protection of the laws which these bodies may claim is only such as is
accorded to similar associations within the jurisdiction of the State.98
However, in rejecting an alternative claim that the Privileges and Immunities
Clause applied to corporations, the Court relied on an earlier case and rationale that
emphasized the concession theory: “[T]he term citizens, as used in the clause,
applies only to natural persons, members of the body politic owing allegiance to
95

The Railroad Tax Cases, 13 F. 722, 740–44 (C.C.D. Cal. 1882) (“[W]e think that it
is well established . . . that whenever a provision of the constitution, or of a law, guarantees
to persons the enjoyment of property, or affords to them means for its protection, or
prohibits legislation injuriously affecting it, the benefits of the provision extend to
corporations, and that the courts will always look beyond the name of the artificial being to
the individuals whom it represents.”).
96
Id. at 747 (“To deprive the corporation of its property, or to burden it, is, in fact, to
deprive the corporators of their property or to lessen its value. Their interest, undivided
though it be, and constituting only a right during the continuance of the corporation to
participate in its dividends, and on its dissolution to receive a proportionate share of its
assets, has an appreciable value, and is property in a commercial sense; and whatever
affects the property of the corporation necessarily affects the commercial value of their
interest.”).
97
125 U.S. 181 (1888).
98
Id. at 189.
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the State, not to artificial persons created by the legislature, and possessing only
such attributes as the legislature has prescribed.”99
Thus the Court recognized the Santa Clara pronouncement in Pembina, but
oscillated in its reasoning between viewing a corporation as an aggregate of
individuals meriting rights and alternately as a concession of the state justifying
limitations on rights. Accordingly, as in its earlier case law, the Court accorded
corporations equal protection with regard to property interests as it would similar
associations but did not confuse corporations with individuals themselves, who
have citizenship rights under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.100
One year later, in Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad v. Beckwith, 101 the
Court relied on Santa Clara and Pembina Mining to hold that corporations could
invoke Fourteenth Amendment due process protections.102 Specifically, the Court
stated:
It is contended by counsel as the basis of his argument, and we admit the
soundness of his position, that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the clause in question [the Fourteenth Amendment]. It was so
held in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., and the
doctrine was reasserted in Pembina Mining Co v. Pennsylvania. We
admit also, as contended by him, that corporations can invoke the
benefits of provisions of the Constitution and laws which guaranty to
persons the enjoyment of property, or afford to them the means for its
protection, or prohibit legislation injuriously affecting it.103
Although the Court discussed the scope of the due process protection, the Court
did not further explain the basis for allowing corporations to invoke it.104 The case
provided merely an affirmation of the right and its property-based rationale.
The Court also extended Fifth Amendment due process protection to
corporate property in Noble v. Union River Logging Railroad Co.,105 in which an
act of the secretary of the interior would have revoked and annulled an existing
grant of public lands to a railroad corporation.106 The Court did not explain why
the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause should apply to corporations, but noted
that it viewed the revocation as “an attempt to deprive the plaintiff [corporation] of
its property without due process of law.”107
99

Id. at 187–88.
See id.
101
129 U.S. 26 (1889).
102
Id. at 27–28.
103
Id. at 28.
104
Id. at 28–36.
105
147 U.S. 165 (1892).
106
The Noble Court did not explain its application of the Fifth Amendment to a
corporation, but as the defendant was the federal government, the case has been understood
as a due process case under the Fifth Amendment. See Mayer, supra note 7, at 591.
107
Noble, 147 U.S. at 274.
100
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III. BEYOND THE DOCTRINE’S ROOTS: UNGROUNDED EXPANSIONS
While the nineteenth century saw the rise of the corporation and ushered in
cases focused on rights related to shareholders’ property and contract interests, the
twentieth century staged a significant expansion of corporate rights beyond this
context. Despite robust debate of corporate personality from the turn of the century
to the 1930s, as well as dissenting calls for reexamination of the doctrine, the Court
has not grounded the expansions of corporate rights in a coherent concept of
corporate personhood nor used a consistent approach in determining the scope of
corporate rights. At times, the Court has used varying conceptions of the
corporation; it has relied on nineteenth century cases that were decided in the
context of property and contract rights; it has focused on the history or purpose of
a particular amendment; and it has even accorded a right to corporations without
explanation. Mapping the panoply of corporate rights and the rationale for them
has become increasingly complex, and what the doctrine of corporate personhood
stands for has become obscured.
This section traces this ungrounded expansion beyond the doctrine’s roots by
examining the Court’s recognition of corporate criminal liability, the theoretical
debates and the modernization of the business corporation, the calls for
reexamination in the post-Lochner era, and the later-established suite of corporate
rights. The only common thread through the doctrine’s origins and subsequent
developments is the notion that corporations may hold rights in order to protect the
individuals behind them. This is an important principle, but it does not speak to
whether corporations should have a particular right; it only provides a starting
point of analysis.
A. Recognition of Corporate Criminal Liability
Tracing the corporate personhood doctrine in the twentieth century begins
with the observation that the flip side of personifying the corporation was
increased interest in corporate criminal liability. Some scholars suggest that the
personification of the corporation in the law indeed inspired a transformed concept
of the corporation as a legal person capable of criminal wrongs.108 Despite this
108

See WILLIAM S. LAUFER, CORPORATE BODIES AND GUILTY MINDS: THE FAILURE
OF CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 11–12 (“Santa Clara County personified corporations
at a time when states realized that permissive chartering laws could generate vast amounts
of needed revenue. In transforming the conception of a corporation from a lifeless, artificial
being, to a legal person, by allowing businesses to incorporate freely, and with the
divergence of municipal and business corporations, the criminal law became the state’s
response to all sorts of corporate wrongs, from the indictment of railroad companies for the
killing of pedestrians by improperly designed and recklessly operated trolley cars to
elaborate prosecutions of conglomerate companies for illegal combinations.”). But see
Steven Walt & William S. Laufer, Why Personhood Doesn’t Matter: Corporate Criminal
Liability and Sanctions, 18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 263, 263–64 (1991) (arguing that the
personality of a corporation should not matter for purposes of criminal liability).
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significant departure from the property and contract context in which the Court had
established corporate personhood, the Court did not strengthen the reasoning
underpinning this expanding reach of the corporate personhood doctrine.
This is striking because many of the constitutional rights that corporations
enjoy are an outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject to
criminal liability. For example, if corporations were not subject to criminal liability
there would be no need to consider whether they should receive double jeopardy
protection. One would expect that in this crucial post-Santa Clara period the Court
would bolster its rationale for the constitutional treatment of corporations,
particularly in deciding whether to expose corporations to criminal liability, a
different question than the Court had previously addressed in recognizing
corporations as persons in order to protect shareholders’ property and contract
interests in the corporation. But instead, as one commentator has noted,
organizational criminal liability grew like a weed without a rationale.109
Early common law had rejected the idea of imposing criminal responsibility
on corporations because of conceptual obstacles such as attributing an act and
intent to a corporation,110 but by the early twentieth century courts found a broader
approach to imposing liability. With little theoretical grounding, courts imported
tort and agency principles to hold corporations vicariously liable for criminal acts
performed by corporate agents within the scope of employment.111
In Hale v. Henkel, decided in 1906, 112 the Supreme Court held that a
corporation did not have the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but
did have a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures.113
109

Gerhard O.W. Mueller, Mens Rea and the Corporation, 19 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 21
(1957) (“Nobody bred it, nobody cultivated it, nobody planted it. It just grew.”).
110
See N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co. v. United States, 212 U.S. 481, 492
(1909) (citing Chief Justice Holt and Blackstone and explaining that early common law
held a corporation could not commit a crime); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
476 (1765) (“[A] corporation cannot commit treason, or felony, or other crime, in it’s [sic]
corporate capacity.”). For a more detailed history of corporate criminal liability in England
and America, see Brickey, supra note 17, at 396–400, 404–15.
111
See, e.g., United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592, 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1904); United
States v. John Kelso Co., 86 F. 304, 308 (N.D. Cal. 1898); see also Brickey, supra note 17,
at 404–15 (discussing the evolution of corporate accountability in the United States);
Regina A. Robson, Crime and Punishment: Rehabilitating Retribution as a Justification for
Organizational Criminal Liability, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 109, 115 (2010) (discussing the
impediments to holding a corporation criminally liable).
112
201 U.S. 43 (1906).
113
Id. at 69–70, 76–77. The Fifth Amendment provides that “No person shall be . . .
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” U.S. CONST. amend. V.
The Fourth Amendment provides that “The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend IV. The Court’s treatment of corporations in Hale does
not seem to rest on a textual basis as the Fourth Amendment uses the word “people”
whereas the Fifth Amendment uses the word “person.” One scholar has suggested that
pragmatism may have driven this decision as granting corporations the privilege against
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In so holding, the Court oscillated between reasoning based on the concession,
aggregate and real entity views, balancing the recognition that “[c]orporations are a
necessary feature of modern business activity,” with the sense that the state that
creates the corporation must preserve its ability to regulate.114
In New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Co. v. United States,
decided in 1909,115 the Supreme Court definitively recognized corporate criminal
liability and expanded the respondeat superior approach based on “public policy”
rather than any particular view of the corporation. 116 The case involved a
government indictment against a railroad and two of its officers for giving
unlawful rebates under the Elkins Act. The corporation argued that the Elkins Act
was unconstitutional because Congress lacked authority to impute criminal acts to
a corporation, which would effectively punish innocent stockholders and deprive
them of due process. The Supreme Court rejected the corporation’s aggregate-style
argument on the “public policy” basis that doing otherwise would give the
corporation “immunity from all punishment because of the old and exploded
doctrine that a corporation cannot commit a crime.”117 According to the Court, this
“would virtually take away the only means of effectually controlling the subjectmatter and correcting the abuses aimed at.”118
Thus, relying on multiple views of the corporation and “public policy,” the
Court expanded the corporate-person metaphor to the criminal context, involving a
different set of questions than the protection of property and contracts. The
limitations of the Court’s conceptions of the corporation became apparent as the
Court oscillated between them, sometimes even in the same opinion.119 The only
unifying strand between these disparate cases was the recognition of corporations
as capable of holding rights or liabilities.

self-incrimination could have critically impeded criminal prosecution of corporations,
whereas giving corporations some protection against unreasonable government searches
and seizures would not entirely insulate corporations from criminal enforcement. See Peter
J. Henning, The Conundrum of Corporate Criminal Liability: Seeking a Consistent
Approach to the Constitutional Rights of Corporations in Criminal Prosecutions, 63 TENN.
L. REV. 793, 797 (1996).
114
See Hale, 201 U.S. at 69–76.
115
212 U.S. 481 (1909).
116
See id. at 483, 494–96.
117
Id. at 496.
118
Id.
119
See Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 69–76 (1906); see also id. at 79–83 (McKenna,
J., concurring) (noting the internal incoherence between the Court’s Fourth and Fifth
Amendment analysis); Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner Era:
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 599–601
(1996) (discussing the Court’s use of multiple conceptions of the corporation and
pragmatism, noting “the Court’s preposterous classifications of the same corporation as
both an artificial and a natural entity.”).
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B. The Rise of the Modern Business Corporation and the “End” of the Theoretical
Debate About Corporate Personhood
In the early twentieth century, debate about corporate personality reached a
fever pitch, spanning the United States and Europe, the fields of law and
philosophy, and then faded just as the business corporation entered a
transformative period.120 The direction of the legal debate about corporations and
their ontological nature moved to legal realism, the view that theories of corporate
personality, such as reflected in the concession, aggregate, and real entity views,
were indeterminate. Many commentators view John Dewey’s 1926 Yale Law
Journal article as having put an end to the corporate personhood debate.121 Dewey
dismissed the debate as pointless because “‘person’ signifies what law makes it
signify.”122 Building on the English jurist Frederic Maitland’s statement that the
corporation is “a right-and-duty-bearing unit,” Dewey pragmatically argued that
“person” “convey[s] no implications, except that the unit has those rights and
duties from which the courts find it to have.”123
According to Dewey, the significance of “person” in common speech or
philosophy is irrelevant.124 Assumptions about inherent attributes that a unit must
have to be a juridical person, such as implied concepts of personality or inherent
essence, were wrongly imported into legal discussion and generated “confusion
and conflict.” 125 Dewey concluded that “there is no clear-cut line, logical or
practical, through the different theories which have been advanced”; “[e]ach theory
has been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing
ends.” 126 In brief, political ideology was driving adherence to the competing
theories. Accordingly, he advocated “eliminating the idea of personality until the
concrete facts and relations involved have been faced and stated on their own
account: retaining the word will then do no great harm.” 127 The corporate
personality debate needed a more concrete understanding of society’s interests and
the functional relations involved.
Around this time, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means also published their
influential book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 128 The book
120

HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 100–05.
Multiple commentators have observed that Dewey’s article put an end to the
debate, for example HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 68; Bratton, Jr., supra note 74, at 1491;
David A. Skeel, Jr., Corporate Anatomy Lessons, 113 YALE L.J. 1519, 1527 (2004)
(reviewing REINIER KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A
COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL APPROACH (2004)).
122
Dewey, supra note 8, at 655.
123
Id. at 656.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 658.
126
Id. at 669.
127
Id. at 673.
128
ADOLF A. BERLE JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
121
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came after the beginning of a major transformation at the turn of the twentieth
century. Corporations exploded in number and size, 129 corporate ownership
diversified and dispersed, and a national stock market emerged.130 Stock ownership
was on the rise: the number of shareholders of American corporations more than
quadrupled between 1900 and 1928. 131 The rise of a national stock market 132
hastened the development of a class of corporate managers and the conversion of
shareholders’ role into passive investors.133 Whereas previously large businesses
had often been owned by an individual or small group of individuals, large
businesses were increasingly owned by a dispersed group of shareholders.134
In their well-known work, Berle and Means focused attention on this growing
dispersion of stock ownership and the separation of ownership and managerial
control in corporate governance.135 This concept eroded the view of shareholders
as “owners” of the corporation and revealed the conflicting interests of the people
involved with the corporation. 136 Delegating control of the corporation to
professional managers created costs as the managers might not act for the benefit
of the shareholders. Shareholders had moved from a position of private ownership
to merely acting as passive recipients of capital returns. According to Berle and
129

The number of corporations increased exponentially in the nineteenth century and
state corporation laws eased their earlier strictures. Whereas by 1800 there were about 300
corporations, mostly with a quasi-public purpose, by the turn of the twentieth century, there
were approximately 500,000 business corporations. Blair, supra note 16, at 389 n.3.
Corporations were no longer associated with achieving a quasi-public purpose for the
public benefit; many enterprises engaged in manufacturing and trade for private gain.
States’ relatively strict reign of corporations through limited powers granted in charters,
rules prohibiting stock ownership in other corporations, and other limitations had faded
away. See, e.g., HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 73–74, 80–84; Mark, supra note 70, at 1444–
45.
130
See ALFRED CHANDLER, JR., THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION
IN AMERICAN BUSINESS (1977); HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 94–95.
131
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128, at 53, 56.
132
Between 1890 and 1893, the New York Stock Exchange began to list “industrials.”
HORWITZ, supra note 23, at 95. After 1897, companies publicly offered shares of stock. Id.
This replaced the previous system of private subscriptions. Id. Between 1896 and 1907, the
number of shares traded on the Stock Exchange increased from 57 million to 260 million.
Id.
133
Id. at 95–97.
134
See CHANDLER, JR., supra note 130, at 79–205, 287–89.
135
BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128; see also CHANDLER, JR., supra note 130
(discussing the development of the modern business corporation and the rise of
managerialism in the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century); Mark, supra note 70, at
1475 (discussing Ernst Freund’s views and contributions to management hierarchy in
modern corporations); MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL
ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994) (discussing the development of the
large corporation with dispersed share ownership in the context of American politics).
136
See MEIR DAN-COHEN, RIGHTS, PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 18–19 (1986)
(discussing the impact of Berle and Means); BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2–3.
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Means, “[c]orporations . . . ceased to be merely legal devices through which the
private business transactions of individuals may be carried on.”137
In any event, “[b]y 1930 the dialogue had largely run its course, with the
general consensus being that a corporation was an important legal form which was
more than a mere contractual aggregation but which could not truly be equated
with a natural person.”138 After this debate quieted, most corporate law scholars
simply accepted corporate personhood as a given, without pushing for a particular
philosophical conception of the corporation to ground this concept.139
C. A Transitional Period in Judicial Approach
In the legal world, the nineteenth century cases that provided corporations
with equal protection and due process rights had built a foundation for
corporations—as constitutional “persons”—to seek substantive due process in the
early twentieth century. After the landmark Lochner decision in 1905, 140
corporations posed many challenges to state statutes under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the substantive due process doctrine. 141 Thus, protecting
corporations from a wide variety of government regulation emerged as a broader
effect of recognizing corporate personhood.142
In the mid-1930s, the Court changed its direction with the substantive due
process doctrine. 143 The Court did not reconsider its interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment with respect to corporate personhood, however, despite
137

BERLE & MEANS, supra note 128, at 56 (Table VIII) (estimated number of
shareholders in the United States in 1900 was 4.4 million and in 1928 was 18 million).
138
Brian R. Cheffins, The Trajectory of (Corporate Law) Scholarship, 63
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 456, 479 (2004). Some literature around this time suggests that there was
at least a trickle left of discussion. See, e.g., ALEXANDER NEKAM, THE PERSONALITY
CONCEPTION OF THE LEGAL ENTITY (1938); E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., Corporate Personality,
44 HARV. L. REV. 309 (1930) (book review); Max Radin, The Endless Problem of
Corporate Personality, 32 COLUM. L. REV. 643 (1932); Martin Wolff, On the Nature of
Legal Persons, 54 LAW Q. REV. 494 (1938).
139
Skeel, Jr., supra note 121, at 1527.
140
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52–54 (1905) (invalidating a state statute
limiting the working hours of bakery employees by reading into the Fourteenth
Amendment a requirement for economic substantive due process and freedom of contract).
141
Mayer, supra note 7, at 588–92.
142
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES 613 (3d ed.
2006) (“[I]n 1886, the Supreme Court held that corporations were ‘persons’ under the due
process and equal protection clauses. This meant, of course, that corporations could use the
Constitution . . . to challenge government regulations.”). Some have argued that this
constitutes a relative narrowing of individual rights and power. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note
92, at 132.
143
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (overruling a liberty
of contract decision, Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)); see also
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 142, at 622–25 (discussing the Court’s move away from the
Lochner era).
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several notable dissents as well as the significant corporate changes and the end of
the debate about corporate personality, as discussed above.
For example, in Connecticut General Co. v. Johnson,144 applying precedent
treating corporations as persons under the Fourteenth Amendment, the majority
held that a California statute violated the Due Process Clause by taxing a
Connecticut insurance company on receipt in Connecticut of reinsurance premiums
for risks originally insured in California.145 No act related to the contracts took
place in California and the performance of the contracts did not depend upon any
privilege or authority granted by California. 146 In his dissent, Justice Black
emphasized that the history and plain meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment
“sought to prevent discrimination by the states against classes or races” and did not
include corporations.147 Invoking the Court’s recent West Coast Hotel148 decision
that changed direction on the substantive due process doctrine, he called on the
Court to overrule precedents interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as including
corporations:
I do not believe the word “person” in the Fourteenth Amendment
includes corporations. The doctrine of stare decisis, however appropriate
and even necessary at times, has only a limited application in the field of
constitutional law. This Court has many times changed its interpretations
of the Constitution when the conclusion was reached that an improper
construction had been adopted. Only recently the case of West Coast
Hotel Co. v. Parrish, expressly overruled a previous interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment which had long blocked state minimum wage
legislation. . . . I believe this Court should now overrule previous
decisions which interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment to include
corporations.149
Justice Black explained the lack of historical and textual basis for interpreting
the Fourteenth Amendment as including corporations. 150 He characterized the
implication of this interpretation as “granting new and revolutionary rights to
corporations” that “deprive[d] the states of their long-recognized power to regulate
corporations.”151 Further, he argued that the people and the states did not adopt the
amendment with the intent of granting these rights or with the knowledge that it
would be so construed: “The history of the Amendment proves that the people
were told that its purpose was to protect weak and helpless human beings and were
not told that it was intended to remove corporations in any fashion from the control
144

303 U.S. 77 (1938).
Id. at 80–82.
146
Id. at 81.
147
Id. at 89 (Black, J., dissenting).
148
300 U.S. 379 (1937).
149
Conn. Gen. Co., 303 U.S. at 85 (Black, J., dissenting).
150
Id. at 85–90.
151
Id. at 86, 89.
145
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of state governments.” 152 Justice Black concluded that the Court should not
construe the Fourteenth Amendment to include corporations, and noted that if
Americans wanted to give corporations this protection they could amend the
Constitution.153
Some years later, together with Justice Black, Justice Douglas dissented on
the same basis in Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 154 another case concerning
taxation of an out-of-state corporation.155 However, in the majority opinion, Justice
Jackson deemed it unnecessary to reconsider Fourteenth Amendment corporate
personhood, and wrote separately to explain:
It was not questioned by the State in this case, nor was it considered by
the courts below. It has consistently been held by this Court that the
Fourteenth Amendment assures corporations equal protection of the
laws, at least since 1886, and that it entitles them to due process of law,
at least since 1889. 156
Justice Jackson continued, “[i]n view of this record I did not, and still do not,
consider it necessary for the Court opinion to review the considerations which
justify the assumption that these corporations have standing to raise the issues
decided.”157
A critical opportunity to clarify the Court’s reasoning and approach to
corporate personhood was thus lost. The Court had recently reexamined its
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence with respect to substantive due process158
and could have likewise reconsidered the basis for corporate personhood. It was
still relatively early in the development of corporate rights, while the corporation
was beginning to modernize, and Dewey had drawn attention to the indeterminacy
of the existing corporate personality views. 159 Instead, the Court formalistically
relied on the conclusion that a corporation is a constitutional person. To be sure,
152

Id. at 87.
Id. at 90 (“If the people of this nation wish to deprive the States of their sovereign
rights to determine what is a fair and just tax upon corporations doing a purely local
business within their own state boundaries, there is a way provided by the Constitution to
accomplish this purpose. That way does not lie along the course of judicial amendment to
that fundamental charter. An Amendment having that purpose could be submitted by
Congress as provided by the Constitution. I do not believe that the Fourteenth Amendment
had that purpose, nor that the people believed it had that purpose, nor that it should be
construed as having that purpose.”).
154
337 U.S. 562 (1949).
155
Id. at 576–81 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
156
Id. at 574 (Jackson, J., concurring).
157
Id. at 576 (Jackson, J., concurring).
158
See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 399–400 (1937) (overruling a
previous interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment concerning the freedom of contract,
which had blocked state wage legislation).
159
See supra Part III.B.
153
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Justice Douglas and Justice Black valiantly called attention to the need for
reconsideration and the lack of historical and textual support for the corporate
person conclusion. But their dissents are also problematic in that they failed to
explain why the individuals behind the corporation should be deprived of the
protection they would receive if they acted through an unincorporated business.160
D. The Annex of Corporate Constitutional Rights Jurisprudence
The 1960s marked the beginning of a major expansion of corporate
constitutional rights and protections.161 At times, the Court has simply accorded a
right to corporations without explanation. 162 Sometimes echoes of earlier
conceptions of the corporation have reverberated in the case law or the Court has
focused on the history or purpose of the amendment at issue on an ad hoc basis.163
In doing so, the Court often relied on case law that was made in the different
context of protecting investors’ property and contract interests, at a time when
many corporations were significantly different. Through this process, corporations
have received many, but not all, of the protections and guarantees that are afforded
to natural persons. 164 These can loosely be categorized as rights relating
160

As discussed in Part II.D, the view that the corporation represented individuals
with protectable property interests may have animated the Court’s pronouncement in Santa
Clara. The majority in Connecticut General, subtly echoing this view, stated: “A
corporation which is allowed to come into a state and there carry on its business may claim,
as an individual may claim, the protection of the Fourteenth Amendment against a
subsequent application to it of state law.” Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S 77,
79–80 (1938). Although Justice Douglas made strong historical and textual points about the
Fourteenth Amendment in his Wheeling Steel dissent, he did not explain how to reconcile
that under his view people acting in an unincorporated business would receive protections
that people acting through the corporate form would not.
161
Mayer, supra note 7, at 620–51.
162
See id. at 621, 629 (“The Court retreated to pragmatism in response to criticisms of
corporate personhood theory. . . . Frequently the Court looked to the history of the
amendment in question to justify corporate rights, as in the case of the fourth amendment;
occasionally the Court examined the underlying purposes of an amendment, as in its
handling of the first amendment; and sometimes the Court conferred Bill of Rights
protections on corporations with no explanation, as with the fifth, sixth, and seventh
amendments.”); Henning, supra note 113, at 798–99 & n.19 (discussing double jeopardy
jurisprudence as an example of the Court assuming without explanation that constitutional
protections apply to corporations).
163
See Mayer, supra note 7; Elizabeth Salisbury Warren, Note, The Case for Applying
the Eighth Amendment to Corporations, 49 VAND. L. REV. 1313, 1317 (1996); Note,
Constitutional Rights of the Corporate Person, 91 YALE L.J. 1641, 1644–45 (1982)
(“There is no way to bring unity to these many decisions [regarding corporate
constitutional rights], for they rest on radically different conceptions of the person whose
rights and duties receive judicial definition.”).
164
In this Article, the term “rights” refers to legal rights or privileges, not moral
rights. For a discussion of whether moral rights should be ascribed to corporations, see
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particularly to property and contract interests, 165 rights related to the criminal
context such as searches and trials, and finally speech rights.
While the corporate rights relating particularly to property and contract
interests are at the root of the nineteenth century corporate personhood doctrine,
corporate rights related to searches and trials did not originate until the turn of the
twentieth century and have continued to develop since then. 166 As noted,
corporations enjoy Fourth Amendment safeguards against unreasonable regulatory
searches, but do not have a Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.167 Corporations enjoy Fifth Amendment protections for liberty and
against double jeopardy, 168 and arguably Sixth and Seventh Amendment
entitlements as “persons” to trial by jury.169
Finally, perhaps receiving the most public attention, corporate speech is
protected under the First Amendment.170 Broadly speaking, both commercial and
PETER A. FRENCH, COLLECTIVE AND CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (1984); PATRICIA H.
WERHANE, PERSONS, RIGHTS AND CORPORATIONS 60–75 (1985).
165
See Mayer, supra note 7, at 590–91 & n.71; supra Part II.B, D, E.
166
In a sense, many of the constitutional rights that corporations enjoy are the
outgrowth of the Court’s recognition of the corporation as subject to criminal liability. For
arguments against corporate criminal liability, see V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal
Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1484–88 (1996)
(arguing on efficiency grounds that corporate criminal liability serves no purpose); Daniel
R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 322 (1996)
(arguing that corporate criminal liability “is inferior as a practical matter to an appropriate
corrective on the civil side”); cf. Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal
Liability, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 833, 846 (2000) (arguing the modern corporation
has an “independent identity” based on “an identifiable persona and a capacity to express
moral judgments,” and thus corporate criminal liability can serve a retributive purpose).
167
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 75–77 (1906). For a discussion of the development of
corporate rights under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, see Henning, supra note 113, at
826–40; Christopher Slobogin, Subpoenas and Privacy, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 805, 814–18
(2005).
168
United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1977)
(discussing double jeopardy); Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141 (1962) (discussing
double jeopardy); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Sec’y of Def., 631 F.2d 953, 969
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (discussing liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause). For a discussion of some restrictions on double jeopardy protection, see Khanna,
supra note 166, at 1517 n.211.
169
Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 532–34 (1970); Khanna, supra note 166, at 1518
& n.216.
170
These corporate speech protections are not without limit. Whereas courts apply
strict scrutiny when reviewing burdens on corporate political speech, under the commercial
speech doctrine, courts apply a lower standard, and states may regulate the content of
commercial speech for truthfulness. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Servs.
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 561–66 (1980) (using a balancing test to determine
restrictions on corporate commercial speech); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 776–786 (1978) (applying strict scrutiny to restrictions on corporate political
speech). In addition, corporations have been long subject to mandatory silent periods and
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political speech protections date back to the 1970s for corporations.171 The Court
has also recognized that corporations have the right not to speak or be associated
with speech of others.172 The Court’s mode of analysis has varied considerably, but
in many cases, including most recently in Citizens United, the Court has relied on
the idea that the First Amendment concerns the rights of listeners and the
“marketplace of ideas” rather than the speaker’s identity.173
While the Court has significantly expanded corporate rights, it has not
grounded these expansions in a coherent concept of corporate personhood. For
example, in the 1978 case First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,174 one of the
first Supreme Court cases to broadly protect corporate political spending as speech,
the Court struck down a state law that prohibited corporations from spending
money to influence the vote on referendum proposals having no material effect on
the property, business, or assets of the corporation. 175 The majority opinion by
Justice Powell reframed the question answered by the courts below—whether
corporations have or should have First Amendment rights coextensive with those
of natural persons—to instead examine whether the statute “abridge[d] expression
compelled disclosures under federal securities laws that have been in effect since the
1930s. See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 93–106 (arguing that federal securities
laws contain provisions in violation of the First Amendment); Adam Winkler, Corporate
Personhood and the Rights of Corporate Speech, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863, 871 (2007)
(noting that if the Court were to recognize a broad corporate right to speak about matters of
public concern then important federal securities laws would be in question). And, campaign
finance laws continue to restrict direct corporate contributions for the election of
candidates. Tillman Act, Pub. L. No. 59–36, 34 Stat. 864, 864–65 (1907) (prohibiting
corporate campaign contributions); see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 143 (1976) (per
curiam) (striking down Federal Election Campaign Act limits on candidate and
independent campaign expenditures while upholding contribution limits, reasoning that the
government’s interest in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption in the
electoral process was adequate to justify only the latter).
171
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
761–70 (1976); Cent. Hudson Gas, 447 U.S. at 561–66 (commercial speech); Bellotti, 435
U.S. at 776–86 (political speech). The Court had earlier held unconstitutional a state license
tax imposed on newspaper corporations selling advertising space as an impermissible
abridgment of the freedom of speech or speech of the press under the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 243–44 (1936).
The Court relied on precedents holding that corporations are “persons” for Fourteenth
Amendment purposes and precedents holding that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment safeguards freedom of speech and of the press against abridgement
by state legislation. Id.
172
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 2 (1986) (holding
unconstitutional under the First Amendment a state regulation allowing an advocacy group
to enclose inserts in a public utility’s newsletter mailing).
173
For a critique of the marketplace of ideas approach, see Tushnet, supra note 92, at
253. For an argument that corporate personhood has played a smaller role in shaping
corporate speech rights than some believe, see Winkler, supra note 170, at 863–68.
174
435 U.S. 765 (1978).
175
Id. at 768.
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that the First Amendment was meant to protect.” 176 This is consistent with the
language of the First Amendment, which is not framed as the grant of an individual
right and does not refer to “persons.”177
To answer this reframed question, the Court identified the case as concerning
speech about a referendum issue, a type of political speech within the purview of
the First Amendment, and then concluded that the statute was invalid under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments because it impinged this speech, regardless of
the identity of the speaker.178 The Court based this decision on the idea that the
purpose of the First Amendment is to protect a marketplace of ideas and that the
source of the speech is not determinative.179
However, the Court also invoked jurisprudence under the corporate
personhood doctrine, noting that First Amendment freedom of speech is within the
liberty safeguarded by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that “[i]t has been settled for almost a century that corporations are persons within
the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.” 180 The Court cited Santa Clara
without explanation.181
At this point, the Court’s analysis might arguably appear as a sleight of hand.
The Court first stated that the question was not about the rights of corporations, but
then pointed to corporations’ rights as persons under the Fourteenth
Amendment.182 The Court relied on this Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence to
apply the First Amendment to the state action at issue in the case. 183 Citing
precedent stating the corporation is a “person” within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment does not explain, however, the extent to which a
corporation is protected in spending money to influence referenda not materially
affecting the business of the corporation.184 To this extent, the Court’s analysis was
both internally contradictory and substantively incoherent.
Further, the Court left largely unexamined the various types and dynamics of
corporations and their impact in considering whether the statute met the strict
scrutiny standard. 185 For example, in response to an argument that the statute
served state interests in protecting shareholders against the use of corporate funds
to support views they opposed, the Court stated: “Ultimately shareholders may
176

Id. at 775–76.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . . abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .”).
178
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 784.
179
See id. at 810 (White, J., dissenting).
180
Id. at 778–80 & n.15 (citing Santa Clara Cnty. v. S. Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394
(1886)).
181
Id. at 780 & n.15.
182
Id. at 778–80.
183
See id.
184
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 173 n.61 (noting that the characterization
of the corporation as a “person” in Bellotti “does not help clarify the scope of constitutional
protection of corporate political speech”).
185
See Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 789–95.
177
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decide, through the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation
should engage in debate on public issues.”186 This view ignores, however, that “the
reality of the large corporation is far from democratic, because shareholders rarely
have the incentive to exercise their legal rights.”187 Moreover, this view ignores the
fact that the procedures of “corporate democracy” do not actually empower
shareholders to control the corporation’s political spending in a meaningful way.188
Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, grappled with this
modern corporate context in his dissent. Instead of unquestioning reliance on Santa
Clara, Justice White argued that “an examination of the First Amendment values
that corporate expression furthers and the threat to the functioning of a free society
it is capable of posing reveals that it is not fungible with communications
emanating from individuals and is subject to restrictions which individual
expression is not.” 189 According to Justice White, corporate speech should be
protected when it furthers the shareholders’ self-expression, such as when
corporations are formed to advance particular ideological causes shared by all
members or press corporations formed to disseminate information and ideas. 190
For-profit corporations are not formed for achieving self-expression;
“[s]hareholders in such entities do not share a common set of political or social
views, and they certainly have not invested their money for the purpose of
advancing political or social causes.” 191 That is, shareholders in for-profit
corporations lack a common purpose with regard to what the legislation at issue in
Bellotti prohibited—corporate spending to influence public opinion or votes on
referenda having no material connection to the corporation’s business or property.
Thus, in Justice White’s view, the majority failed to appreciate that the state’s
decision in balancing competing First Amendment interests in the legislation
relating to such corporate expenditures would pass “even the most exacting
scrutiny.”192
IV. THE COURT’S FLAWED CONCEPTIONS OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
The notion of the corporate person in constitutional jurisprudence is rooted in
concerns about protecting contracts and property, resembling the ethos of the legal
186

Id. at 794–95.
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing the contractual theory of the
corporation).
188
Pollman, supra note 4, at 55–58.
189
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 804 (White, J., dissenting).
190
Id. at 805.
191
Id. Justice White concluded that the state had therefore struck a permissible
balance between the First Amendment interests involved in the case. Id. at 821–22 (“The
electoral process, of course, is the essence of our democracy. It is an arena in which the
public interest in preventing corporate domination and the coerced support by shareholders
of causes with which they disagree is at its strongest and any claim that corporate
expenditures are integral to the economic functioning of the corporation is at its weakest.”).
192
Id. at 804.
187
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personality doctrine giving the corporation its ability to function as a separate legal
unit. 193 Key constitutional precedents like Dartmouth College and Santa Clara
expressed the notion that real people exist behind the corporation and their
property and contract interests should be protected, as they would have been if they
had not acted through the corporate form.194
Later taking an ad hoc approach to determining the scope of corporate rights,
the Court expanded these rights by relying on the older cases, or assumptions
stemming from them, without explaining their application in new contexts such as
in criminal law and, at times, in First Amendment jurisprudence.195
Although the three conceptions of corporate personality from the nineteenth
century still find their way into opinions, they do not bolster the Court’s reasoning
because each conception is flawed or incomplete and the Court’s variance with
them only adds to the inconsistency of its approach. None of these conceptions
fully explain why corporations should or should not receive constitutional rights
and what the scope of those rights should be. It appears that not much has changed
since John Dewey’s observation that “there is no clear-cut line, logical or practical,
through the different theories which have been advanced . . . [e]ach theory has
been used to serve the same ends, and each has been used to serve opposing
ends.”196 The concession theory sometimes emerges when the Court, or a justice
writing in dissent, is justifying a limitation on corporate power.197 A sign of this
rhetorical move is a quote of Chief Justice Marshall’s famous characterization of
193

See discussion supra Part II.B; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 51, at 1640–41.
See discussion supra Part II.B, D.
195
See discussion supra Part III.A, D.
196
Dewey, supra note 8, at 669. For example, while in Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14,
Justice Powell called the concession view “an extreme position [that] could not be
reconciled with the many decisions . . . affording corporations the protection of
constitutional guarantees,” he later used the view to justify the decision in CTS Corp. v.
Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987). CTS concerned the constitutionality of a
state anti-takeover regulation under the Commerce Clause. Justice Powell quoted Chief
Justice Marshall’s famous characterization of the corporation as a state-created “artificial
being”—the same view Justice Powell had previously called “extreme.” Compare id. at 89
(quoting Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 638 (1819)), with
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 778 n.14.
197
See, e.g., United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 652 (1950)
(“[C]orporations can claim no equality with individuals in the enjoyment of a right to
privacy. They are endowed with public attributes. They have a collective impact upon
society, from which they derive the privilege of acting as artificial entities. The Federal
Government allows them the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce. Favors from
government often carry with them an enhanced measure of regulation.”); Austin v. Mich.
Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 653, 660, 680 (1990), overruled by Citizens United
v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010); CTS, 481 U.S. at 89 (“We think the Court of Appeals failed
to appreciate the significance . . . of the fact that state regulation of corporate governance is
regulation of entities whose very existence and attributes are a product of state law. As
Chief Justice Marshall explained: ‘A corporation is an artificial being, invisible, intangible,
and existing only in contemplation of law.’”).
194
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the corporation as “an artificial being, intangible, and existing only in
contemplation of law.” 198 The Court sometimes invokes the aggregate and real
entity views when justifying recognition of corporate power or protection, and
sometimes when justifying the contrary position.199
Regarding the substantive weaknesses of these views, the concession theory
may still describe an important aspect of corporations, but it does not fully mesh
with contemporary times; it envisions more state action and control than is the case
when incorporating is a mere administrative formality. As incorporation is no
longer a special grant there is also no longer any sense of an associated monopoly
power. Arguably the only concessions from the state are limited liability and legal
personality itself, 200 which scholars have noted cannot be practicably achieved
through contracting.201 However, many legal thinkers do not see this as enough
justification for the state to retain a tight leash on corporations, or to explain our
current jurisprudence that has moved beyond this view.202 Further, as corporations
can change their place of incorporation, switching state or even country, the
198

Dartmouth College, 17 U.S. at 636; see, e.g., Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 948
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation in support of
the idea that the Framers assumed corporations could be comprehensively regulated for
public welfare and arguing that the majority’s rejection of restrictions on corporate political
spending was a “radical departure from what had been settled First Amendment law”);
CTS, 481 U.S. at 89 (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to support the
constitutionality of a state regulation of corporate governance, specifically a state antitakeover statute); Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 77–79 (1906) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(quoting Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to argue that corporations should
not receive Fourth Amendment protections); see also Fleck & Assocs., Inc. v. Phoenix, 471
F.3d 1100, 1105 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Marshall’s characterization of the corporation to
support enforcement of a city ordinance prohibiting the operation of live sex act businesses,
against a challenge that the ordinance violated the corporation’s privacy rights under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).
199
For example, in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., the Supreme Court explained that the
defendant corporation had a Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable search because
“[t]he businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about
his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property.”
436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978) (quoting See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 543 (1967)). Seemingly,
the Court was looking to people behind the corporation, per the aggregate theory, although
it is not clear whether that was to the managers or shareholders. Compare this with the
entity phrasing in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, in which the Court explained:
“Plainly a business establishment or an industrial or commercial facility enjoys certain
protections under the Fourth Amendment.” 476 U.S. 227, 235 (1986).
200
Perhaps one might expand upon this notion to add “perpetual life, separation of
ownership and control, and favorable treatment of the accumulation and distribution of
assets.” See Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 971 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
201
See Hansmann & Kraakman, Organizational Law, supra note 57, at 390.
202
See Stephen Bainbridge, Citizens United v. FEC: Stevens’ Pernicious Version of
the Concession Theory, PROFESSORBAINBRIDGE.COM (Jan. 21, 2010, 4:05 PM),
www.professorbainbridge.com (“It has been over half-a-century since corporate legal
theory, of any political or economic stripe, took the concession theory seriously.”).
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description of corporations as a concession from a particular state seems a poor fit
in our modern, global environment.203
The aggregate view offers the advantage of explaining why corporations
should have constitutional protections because it recognizes that human actors
exist behind the corporation. But like the concession view, the aggregate view can
be incongruent with modern times, at least in the large company context where it is
not clear whose rights are being protected and what the scope of those rights
should be. In the case of a small, non-profit political advocacy corporation, for
example, its members might be readily identifiable as pursuing shared goals. The
shareholders in large publicly traded corporations, however, number in the
thousands204 and are not a static set of identifiable human actors. They are often
institutional, short-term investors, which change frequently and add layers of
distance in terms of decision-making and monitoring from the humans who
invested their capital.205 Shareholders may also come from outside of the United
States.206 Shareholders do not control corporate decision-making in any real sense,
nor is it necessarily desirable for them to do so. Indeed, the average investor may
be rationally ignorant of the details of the corporation’s governance. 207 Further,
while shareholders may share an interest in the firm’s value, they may not share
other social and political interests.208
The real entity view perhaps meshes best with common conceptions about
corporations. When people think of corporations they do not likely think of
creatures of the state or of clusters of people. As a general matter, they likely think
of corporations as different from human beings. They likely think of the large
companies that are most salient in our daily lives. These corporations are neither
individuals nor the government; they are in their own category. Further, the real
entity view benefits from not being tied to an outdated view of the corporation as a
state concession or as a group of shareholders to be protected.
203

See generally Amir N. Licht, Regulatory Arbitrage for Real: International
Securities Regulation in a World of Interacting Securities Markets, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 563
(1998) (discussing arbitrage of securities laws and the increasingly globalized securities
markets); Robert Reich, Who Is Us?, 32 HARV. BUS. REV. 53 (1990) (discussing the
increasing globalization of American-owned corporations and foreign corporations’
employment of American workers).
204
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L.
REV. 789, 792 (2007) (“It is difficult and expensive to arrange for thousands of dispersed
shareholders to express their often-differing views on the best way to run the firm.”).
205
See id. at 807; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1751–53 (2006).
206
See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Citizens United and the Corporate Form, 2010 WIS. L.
REV. 999, 1031 (discussing how the debate about the nature of the corporation has
reignited with the rise of multinationals and noting that “shareholders now tend to come
from many countries”).
207
See, e.g., BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 6.
208
See, e.g., Grant Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, Shareholder Democracy and the
Curious Turn Toward Board Primacy, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2071, 2095–96 nn.126–30
(2010) (discussing how shareholders’ interests diverge).
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But this view does not illuminate why corporations would receive
constitutional protections. That is, it does not follow ineluctably from looking at
the corporation as a real entity, with unique organizational qualities, that it would
have rights as a person. The Constitution does not mention corporations and we
owe no allegiance to corporations as reified entities, without reference to the idea
that people are involved.
A fundamental problem thus exists with the traditional understanding of
corporate personhood as a unified doctrine based on a conception of the
corporation, and as covering the panoply of recognized corporate rights. If the
Court has moved beyond thinking of corporations in terms of the concession
theory and aggregate theory, then how do we understand continued reliance on the
case law that is based on those views? As discussed above, the real entity theory
was not a common view until after some of the key early precedents such as Santa
Clara and so it is not a part of their reasoning.209 And, even the real entity theory is
incomplete in that it fails to illuminate why the entity should receive constitutional
protection as a person and what the scope of that protection should be. Besides the
mere recognition that corporations may hold rights there is no conceptual core that
ties together this doctrine. There has been no consistently used test or procedure
for determining whether corporations should hold a certain right.
V. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO THE CORPORATE PERSONHOOD DOCTRINE
Tracing the evolving theories of corporate personality and the Court’s shifting
approach shows the need to develop a better way to understand and explain the
legal treatment of different kinds of associations of people, in particular the
constitutional rights of public corporations dominating our culture and economy.
That corporations have a “legal personality” allowing them to contract, own
property, sue and be sued is not controversial. Nor should it be controversial—
these are essential features necessary for corporations’ practical use. This Article
asserts that the roots of the corporate personhood doctrine are likewise akin to
these essential features of legal personality. But there is a growing sense among the
public, and perhaps on the Court, 210 that corporations no longer fit a person
metaphor for purposes of expanding constitutional rights.
209

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
During re-argument in Citizens United, Justice Sotomayor questioned the Court’s
personification of the corporation, perhaps rhetorically:
210

Going back to the question of stare decisis, the one thing that is very
interesting about this area of law for the last 100 years is the active involvement
of both State and Federal legislatures in trying to find that balance between the
interest of protecting in their views how the electoral process should proceed
and the interests of the First Amendment.
And so my question to you is, once we say they can’t, except on the basis
of a compelling government interest narrowly tailored, are we cutting off or
would we be cutting off that future democratic process? Because what you are
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One measure of this is the remarkable public reaction to the recent Citizens
United decision on corporate political speech. Public opinion polls by ABC News
and the Washington Post found that 80% of Americans opposed the Court’s
Citizens United ruling. 211 Anecdotally, a surprisingly large number of online
newspaper articles and blogs covering the case that allow for public comment had
posts rejecting the idea of corporations as persons.212 Reform organizations have
proposed constitutional amendments to preclude corporations from claiming Bill
of Rights protections. One such proposal would amend the Constitution to provide
that “the U.S. Constitution protects only the rights of living human beings.”213
The irony is that the notion of the corporate person was embraced to protect
the rights of living human beings—to protect the property of individuals regardless
of whether it is held in the corporate form. However, the public reaction to Citizens
United shows that while some corporations can still be easily imagined as vehicles
through which individuals pursue their goals, as with other organizations, it has
become increasingly difficult to envision and identify real people behind large
corporations whose diverse rights in various contexts should necessarily be
protected in this form. This is particularly true when the right at issue does not
clearly correspond to the business or economic realm for which shareholders are
assumed to be acting when they invest in a business corporation.
The importance of this task is not limited to a particular case, such as the
recent controversial Citizens United decision. Even accepting that the First
Amendment is a negative restriction on government, not tied to the identity of the

suggesting is that the courts who created corporations as persons, gave birth to
corporations as persons, and there could be an argument made that that was the
Court’s error to start with, not Austin or McConnell, but the fact that the Court
imbued a creature of State law with human characteristics.
Transcript of Oral Argument at 33, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (No. 08205), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/08205[Reargued].pdf. Justice Sotomayor joined in Justice Stevens’ dissent. Citizens United v.
FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 929–80 (2010).
211
See Gary Langer, In Supreme Court Ruling on Campaign Finance, the Public
Dissents, ABCNEWS.COM POLLS (Feb. 17, 2010, 7:00 AM), http://blogs.abcnews.com
/thenumbers/2010/02/in-supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-finance-the-public-dissents.
html. The survey language for these polls left much to be desired in terms of precision, but
the magnitude of public disapproval was notable. See Matt Sundquist, Imprecise Language
and Citizens United Polling, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 5, 2010, 4:34 PM), http://www.scotus
blog.com/2010/03/imprecise-language-and-citizens-united-polling/.
212
E.g., Michael D. Shear, Obama Calls Citizens United Ruling a “Huge Blow”,
WASH. POST (May 1, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2010/05/
obama-calls-citizens-united-ru.html (user comments).
213
Proposed Constitutional Amendments, RECLAIMDEMOCRACY.ORG, http://reclaim
democracy.org/political_reform/proposed_constitutional_amendments.html (last visited
Nov. 23, 2011).
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speaker, that corporate spending is speech, 214 and that disclosure rules could
address other concerns—this does not tell us how to understand the new
battlegrounds that are sure to come. How will the Court analyze the
constitutionality of the responses to Citizens United? Further attacks on campaign
finance laws such as direct campaign contribution limits?215 Disclosure rules?216
How does this apply to unincorporated businesses and other types of
organizations? Foreign nationals? 217 Long-standing federal securities laws? 218
Furthermore, other areas such as privacy are developing that may test the
understanding of corporate personality.219 If the Court continues its approach, the
public will likely continue to view decisions that broaden corporate rights in a
negative light.
Substitute metaphors or concepts of the firm may provide a useful starting
point for more analytical thinking about the legal treatment of modern
corporations. These include the well-known nexus of contracts theory and the
intelligent machine metaphor.220 However, a unifying metaphor or philosophical
theory of the corporation is not needed for the functional analysis in which the
Court should engage. Metaphors and theories of the corporation may in fact
impede or muddy consideration of what is important for that functional analysis—

214

For an argument that restrictions on giving and spending money do not constitute
restrictions on speech, see Hellman, supra note 2, at 953–56; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co.
v. Public Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 33 (1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (warning
that ascribing business corporations the intellect and conscience for First Amendment selfexpression is “to confuse metaphor with reality”); J. Skelly Wright, Politics and the
Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001, 1005, 1019 (1976) (arguing that
“[m]oney . . . may be related to speech, but money itself is not speech” and “nothing in the
First Amendment commits us to the dogma that money is speech”).
215
See Michael S. Kang, After Citizens United, 44 IND. L. REV. 243 (2010)
(discussing the potential impact of Citizens United on campaign finance law, including
corporate contributions).
216
See Daniel Winik, Note, Citizens Informed: Broader Disclosure and Disclaimer
for Corporate Electoral Advocacy in the Wake of Citizens United, 120 YALE L.J. 622
(2010) (discussing the constitutionality of broad disclosure and disclaimer regulations after
Citizens United).
217
See Massaro, supra note 6, at 664–67.
218
See Larry E. Ribstein, The First Amendment and Corporate Governance, 27 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 1019 (2011).
219
For example, the Supreme Court expressly left open the question of whether
corporations have a constitutional right to privacy in recently holding that the “personal
privacy” exemption under the Freedom of Information Act does not encompass
corporations. FCC v. AT&T, 131 S. Ct. 1177, 1179 (2011) (noting the case “[did] not call
for the Court to pass on the scope of a corporation’s ‘privacy’ interests as a matter of
constitutional or common law”).
220
See discussion infra Part V.A.
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real people and the implications for the proper scope of corporate rights.221 The
following discussion explains the limits of substitutes to the corporate-person
metaphor, and presents an alternative approach.
A. The Limits of a Substitute Metaphor
1. The Corporation as Contract
The predominant metaphor in corporate law is not of the corporation as a
person, but rather as a nexus of contracts. According to this view, the firm is the
common party that contracts with all of the firm’s inputs and outputs. 222
Corporations are “simply legal fictions that serve as a nexus for a set of contracting
relationships among individuals.”223
In The Corporation and The Constitution, Henry Butler and Larry Ribstein
“articulate a contractual theory of the corporation that is based on the modern
economics of the firm” and then “apply this theory to the interpretation of
constitutional doctrine.” 224 They argue that constitutional treatment of the
corporation should focus on the economic reality of the corporation, which is not
an artificial government-created entity, but rather a set of contracts created through
private ordering that should be protected from government interference.225
They do not present the nexus of contracts concept as a metaphor for the
corporation; they state that a corporation is in fact a set of contracts.226 Under this

221

See Robert Sapolsky, This is Your Brain on Metaphors, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR
(Nov. 14, 2010, 4:32 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/11/14/this-is-yourbrain-on-metaphors/ (discussing, neurologically, how the brain handles metaphors).
222
For foundational work on the economic concept of the firm as a “nexus of
contracts,” see Armen Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and
Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972), and Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and
Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
223
Jensen & Meckling, supra note 222, at 310; see also Frank Easterbrook & Daniel
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1426 (1989) (“More often than
not a reference to the corporation as an entity will hide the essence of the transaction.”).
224
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at viii; see also Larry E. Ribstein, The
Constitutional Conception of the Corporation, 4 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 95 (1995) (arguing
that the “different theories of the corporation lead to different conclusions about the
appropriate extent of corporate constitutional rights”).
225
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at viii–ix, 143–144.
226
E.g., id. at viii (“Contractarians view the corporation as a set of private contractual
relationships among providers of capital and services.”); id. at 27 (“The book is based on
two general principles. First, in deciding how to apply constitutional principles, the
corporation should be viewed as a set of private contractual relationships subject to
complex market forces. Second, an important implication of this is that corporations, like
other contracts, must be protected from the acts of political agents and private parties who
seek to circumvent contracts through the political process.”); id. at 143 (“[T]he corporation
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notion, corporate contracts should be treated the same as other contracts under the
Constitution.227 “[P]ersonal rights” should be applied to individuals rather than to
the corporation. 228 Furthermore, “courts should take into account economic
principles that relate to the particular context in which the Constitution is being
applied.” 229 This means that “courts should not necessarily apply constitutional
provisions in the same way to all subjects,” and the authors give as an example that
contractual choice of law should be the subject of a special theory of the
Commerce Clause rather than having an “unmanageable ‘grand unified theory’ of
the commerce clause.”230
Importantly, Butler and Ribstein’s work draws attention to the need to update
the constitutional treatment of corporations with the economic and business reality
of the corporation. Their work makes a large contribution to a surprisingly
undeveloped area. Their contractual theory approach is subject to several
criticisms, however.
First, the contract view has been characterized as simply a reinvention of the
aggregate theory representing the opposite pole in a debate with the classic
concession theory. 231 This reinvention criticism fairly observes that the contract
view aims to refute the concession theory. And in light of Part III.B’s discussion of
the history of the corporate personhood debate, perhaps the contract theory should
indeed be viewed with skepticism in the constitutional context, as other unified
conceptions of the corporation have been called out as rhetorical devices to support
their normative implications.232 However, the reinvention criticism notably does
not consider possible differences between the contract view and aggregate view of
the corporation that may be worth exploring.

is fundamentally a set of contracts . . . [and] the law should permit and enforce these
contracts.”).
227
Id. at 1; see also Ribstein, supra note 224, at 103 (“Thus, it does not follow either
from potential externalities inherent in limited tort liability or from the filing prerequisite to
obtaining limited liability that the corporation is not entitled to the same treatment under
the Constitution as other contracts. The extent to which potential externalities justify
regulation is a normative question.”).
228
See BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 143–44.
229
Id. at 144.
230
Id.
231
See, e.g., Stephen Bottomley, The Birds, the Beasts and the Bat: Developing a
Constitutional Theory of Corporate Regulations, 27 FED. L. REV. 243, 255 (1999) (arguing
for “corporation constitutionalism” in which both the concession and contract views are
appreciated: “corporations are more than just artificially created legal institutions . . . and
they are more than just economic institutions”); Bratton, Jr., supra note 74, at 1476–77
(outlining two variants of the “new economic theory” that emerged in the 1970s, tracing
their roots to neoclassical economics and institutional economics, respectively); Millon,
supra note 71, at 203 (arguing “the private aggregation idea has assumed the garb of
neoclassical economics under the ‘corporation as a nexus of contracts’ rubric”).
232
See Dewey, supra note 8.
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Second, the nexus of contracts theory for corporate personality has been
criticized as lacking clear boundaries to define the relevant group.233 For example,
Daniel Greenwood has argued in the context of the First Amendment that
corporations are illegitimate political speakers because, amongst other reasons,
they lack mechanisms to ensure that corporate actions are representative of the
people involved.234 According to Greenwood,
If employees, bondholders, customers, neighbors or other stakeholders
are considered part of the corporation, or if the corporation is seen not as
the shareholders joined together but as a nexus of contracts in which
employees can be thought of as hiring capital just as easily as the other
way around, then the boundaries of the corporation are no longer clear.235
Greenwood maintains that this problem is significant because group boundaries
profoundly affect the legitimacy of actions on the group’s behalf.236
Third, Butler and Ribstein rely on the idea that “it follows . . . from the fact
that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than a creature of state law, that
personal rights in the Constitution should be applied to individuals connected with
the firm rather than to the firm itself,” but do not provide a way to know when a
right qualifies as personal.237 This is a different sort of line-drawing issue than the
boundary problem noted above.
The Court itself has used this phrasing, stating that “[c]ertain ‘purely
personal’ guarantees . . . are unavailable to corporations and other organizations
because the ‘historic function’ of the particular guarantee has been limited to the
protection of individuals.”238 Whether a right is personal “depends on [its] nature,
history, and purpose.”239 The quintessential example of a right the Supreme Court
has deemed “purely personal” is the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.240 But Butler and Ribstein do not seem to be relying on the Court’s
233

Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Essential Speech: Why Corporate Speech Is Not Free, 83
IOWA L. REV. 995, 1030–31 (1998).
234
Id.
235
Id. at 1031.
236
Id. at 1022, 1031.
237
BUTLER & RIBSTEIN, supra note 7, at 143–44 (“Our theory of the Constitution and
the corporation has implications for other constitutional provisions that we do not discuss.
It follows, for example, from the fact that the corporation is a nexus of contracts rather than
a creature of state law, that personal rights in the Constitution should be applied to
individuals connected with the firm rather than to the firm itself. Thus, just as the statecreation theory and personification of the corporation should not play any role in the
determination of corporations’ rights under the First Amendment, contract clause, or
commerce clause, so they should not determine the application of the privilege against selfincrimination in the corporate context or entitle foreign corporations to the privileges and
immunities of citizens.”).
238
Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 779 n.14.
239
Id.
240
United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698, 700 (1944).
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analysis for what would be “personal,” as they give as an example that it was
“clearly wrong for the Court to deny a sole owner or shareholder the Fifth
Amendment privilege of not being forced to incriminate himself by producing
business documents, merely because he had incorporated the business.”241
Accordingly, as the authors do not make clear how to tell what is a “personal
right in the Constitution,” their view does not elucidate which rights corporations
should have and how to determine this. Their work aims to refute the concession
view of the corporation, but does not, and perhaps did not intend to, provide an
overarching way of understanding how the Constitution applies to the corporation.
Finally, in the context of corporate governance, some scholars have tried to
reconcile theories about whether the corporation should be accountable to
shareholders or a larger group of stakeholders or society. They have done so by
arguing that regardless of whether corporations are viewed as concessions or
contracts, they should be regulated when it is in the public interest to do so.242 This
point applies equally well in the corporate personhood context; indeed, it evokes
John Dewey’s argument for analysis without regard to the idea of personality.
Labels for the corporation do not have to be agreed upon in order to understand the
purpose of a constitutional protection and whether according it to corporations
would serve its intended purpose.
2. The Corporation as an Intelligent Machine
Another alternative metaphor for the corporation is Meir Dan-Cohen’s idea of
the corporation as an “intelligent machine.”243 This metaphor likens a corporation
to a business run entirely by computers without human involvement. Dan-Cohen
offers the metaphor in story format to encourage reflection on what features of the
organization should matter for its legal treatment. In the first stage of the story, an
entrepreneur and a few individuals go into business, decide to incorporate and
within a few years go public and grow to a large corporation. 244 Next, the
corporation purchases its entire outstanding stock and completely automates with
computers its operations, management, and decision-making processes.245 At this
point, the corporation is like an intelligent machine. There are no human beings
involved with the corporation and Dan-Cohen posits that the legal treatment of the
corporation would not significantly change.246 In the final stage, the corporation
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confronts economic difficulties that trigger the computers to sell stock to outsiders
and the new shareholders reinstate human managers who hire employees again.247
The intelligent machine metaphor is a thought experiment about the legal
treatment of corporations. It evokes John Dewey’s view that using the word
“person” to refer to a corporation could have meant simply that it is a legal unit
that bears whatever rights and duties it is assigned.248 It would be a person for
some purposes, but not for others. Unlike the person metaphor, however, which
poses a danger of implicit assumptions because we already have a set of laws that
apply to individuals, the intelligent machine metaphor does not carry its own
consequences. And, even if the intelligent machine metaphor seems implausible
because it contemplates a corporation without human involvement, 249 it
nonetheless serves the purpose of forcing consideration of which groups of persons
should matter for a particular legal treatment of corporations and what their
relationships must be like to justify this treatment. For example, why should a
corporation have double jeopardy protection but not the privilege against selfincrimination?
In sum, the contractual theory and the intelligent machine metaphor imply
that there are weaknesses in the way the Court has applied the Constitution to the
corporation. But they also highlight that a different theory or metaphor for the
corporation may be unnecessary. The response to the contractual theory—that
regardless of whether corporations are viewed as concessions or contracts they
should be regulated when in the public interest to do so—brings us essentially back
to where the corporate personality debate ended in the 1930s.250 And a sensible
view of the intelligent machine metaphor may be that it simply captures the
problem of finding a rationale for protecting corporations when it is not clear what
human interests would justify it. It does not itself explain how to apply the
Constitution to the corporation.
B. An Alternative Approach
As this Article has shown, the roots of the corporate personhood doctrine are
based in concerns about the property and contract interests of shareholders, but
beyond these roots the doctrine is not unified in topic or in approach. This lack of
coherence means that the corporate personhood doctrine stands for little more than
the mere recognition that corporations can hold rights. The Court should not rely
on corporate personhood cases created in different contexts—concerning different
rights and with changing conceptions of the corporation—as rationale for
247
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expanding or contracting the scope of corporate constitutional rights. This would
only exacerbate the incoherence in the case law and raise concerns about the
Court’s legitimacy and transparency. Viewed properly, the doctrine of corporate
personhood is only a starting point for analysis of whether corporations should
hold a particular right at issue.
Furthermore, the Court does not have to substitute a different view or
metaphor for the corporation in its analysis. As Dewey observed, although perhaps
underestimating the lasting power and influence of words,251 retaining the word
“person” will “do no great harm” once “concrete facts and relations involved have
been faced and stated on their account.”252
The goal should be to accord constitutional protections to corporations when
it promotes the objectives of those protections. This premise is consistent with the
early corporate personhood jurisprudence such as Dartmouth College insofar as the
Court treated the corporate charter as a contract warranting Contracts Clause
protection just like any other contract.253 The same concept applies to due process
protection for corporate property. Although shareholders do not have direct control
over the corporation’s property, the objective of protecting property from
government interference is served by protecting corporate property like other
property because individuals still ultimately hold rights with economic value
related to that property. At least as a starting point of analysis, this Article
maintains that, as a general matter, people should not give up constitutional
protections by virtue of acting through a corporation.
Moving beyond this premise, there may be reasons to deny corporations some
protections or to find that their scope is limited. The objectives of the right at issue
may not be served by according it to all corporations.
For example, the Supreme Court may have correctly denied the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to corporations, or to most
corporations. The privilege’s objective is often described as protecting against the
“cruel trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.” 254 The Court has
explained that its purpose is to protect, among other things, a fair individual-state
balance, an “accusatorial rather than inquisitorial system of criminal justice,” and
“respect for the human personality and of the right of each individual to a private
enclave where he may lead a private life.”255 It may indeed be the case that, in
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most circumstances, it is not necessary to accord the privilege to a corporation in
order to protect against the “cruel trilemma.” Notably, the Court has failed to
explain why that is the case, however, and why this would hold in all cases
involving corporations.256
Promulgating all of the consequences of corporate rights using this pragmatic
approach is outside the scope of this Article. However, the question remains
whether the approach is workable. There are multiple pitfalls.
One difficulty in achieving predictability and coherence with this approach
may be that the objectives of the constitutional rights at issue are subject to
multiple interpretations. And, with changing views about the purposes of the First
Amendment, for example, it is likely there would be changing views about whether
protecting corporate “speech” serves those purposes.257 Likewise, how broadly or
narrowly the purposes of an amendment are construed could have a large impact
on the result. This would likely be the case with Fourteenth Amendment analysis
that has long proven controversial.
Another difficulty is in identifying who is being protected when corporations
are granted certain rights. This has been a persistent problem in the case law,
particularly with the rise of the modern business corporation. It probably explains,
at least in part, why the connection between protecting corporations and protecting
people has been seemingly lost to the public. Older cases relying on concession or
aggregate views of the corporation tend to identify, implicitly or explicitly, the
people behind the corporation as the shareholders. Because the real entity view
tends to reify the corporation, it obscures the connection to people. For the reasons
explained in Part IV, none of these conceptions of the corporation provide a
workable answer.
Identifying who is at the core of the corporation has been the subject of heated
debate in corporate law for decades. While most scholars would probably agree
that shareholders are not really “owners” in the traditional sense,258 the question of
Fifth Amendment justifications, see Ronald J. Allen, Theorizing About Self-Incrimination,
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256
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where the locus of corporate power resides or should reside—in directors or
shareholders or a broader group of stakeholders—is unresolved.259 This Article’s
approach does not purport to resolve the question for purposes of corporate law;
rather it identifies this as an area for further development in the literature about
corporate rights.
For purposes of rights analysis, it may make sense to continue viewing
shareholders as the subjects of protections that primarily serve property and
contract interests. Although shareholders are not exactly “owners” of the corporate
property, some stability in the corporation as a separate entity that can hold lockedin capital free from government takings and disruption to corporate charters is
necessary for an investment environment. Recent scholarship on the doctrine of
legal personality has shown this with respect to the essential functions of the
corporation. 260 To wit, this stability also protects the executives, directors, and
other employees, who invest human capital in the corporation, although that may
not be considered a property or contract interest.
For rights stemming from corporate criminal liability, the question is much
harder. More than a century after New York Central, there is still debate about
whether corporations should even be subject to corporate criminal liability. 261
Assuming the premise of corporate criminal liability, the question arises whether
corporations hold rights related to searches and trials because these are simply
system features or if it is to protect shareholders or employees or some other
individuals behind the corporation. To say, as the Court has in the Fourth
Amendment context, that a corporation is “but an association of individuals under
an assumed name and with a distinct legal entity” or that “corporations are a
necessary feature of modern business”262 does not explain whether it serves the
purposes of the right at issue, nor does it explain whose interests would be
shareholders are not owners—that their share ownership gives them no right to claim or
exercise control over their pro rata share of the corporation’s assets or profits.”). But see
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protected. If Fourth Amendment protection of corporations is for shareholders’
benefit, then the right must be, at least in a sense, to protect their property or
economic investment since that is generally the nature of shareholders’ relation to
the business corporation. If it is for employees’ benefit, one is left to wonder how
it actually serves them, since the employee retains his or her own rights as to
prosecutions in an individual capacity. The difficulty of making sense of which
persons behind the corporation are being protected by the Fourth Amendment, and
other rights related to searches and trials, suggests that inadequate attention has
been paid to this question. This deserves greater examination in future challenges
to the scope of these rights, as well as related rights like privacy.
For rights regarding corporate speech, as illustrated above with explanation of
the Bellotti dissent,263 the limited control of shareholders in corporate affairs and
their typically heterogeneous social and political interests may factor into analysis
of the constitutionality of campaign finance legislation. 264 In particular, it may
factor into analysis of whether a particular regulation meets the applicable standard
of scrutiny. Although it did not win the day, the reasoning in the Bellotti dissent
came much closer to an internally consistent explanation that takes account of the
corporate context and the dynamics of the people underlying corporations. Citizens
United failed in that regard, refusing to consider who actually speaks through
corporate spending and relying on Bellotti’s flawed admonition that any abuses
could be corrected “by shareholders through the procedures of corporate
democracy.”265
Finally, while the focus in this Article has been on large business
corporations, there are persistent challenges in considering the rights of different
types of business associations—for example, partnerships, limited liability
companies, as well as different types of corporations, like non-profit corporations
and closely held corporations. Between these different types of associations, the
dynamics of the people underlying the entity differ as does the purpose of the
entity. This adds a wrinkle of complexity in determining whether it furthers the
objective of a particular right to provide it to all business associations or all
corporations. Drawing meaningful lines between them also poses challenges.266 In
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the context of speech, the treatment of media corporations is often raised as
rationale against regulating for-profit corporations.
Despite these difficulties, the approach proposed in this Article at least forces
the identification of people whose rights are being protected through the corporate
form. It may be an exceedingly difficult task, and empirical study of the impact on
different groups of people from granting corporations rights would be helpful.
Where the task proves too difficult and there is uncertainty regarding whether the
objective of the right is being carried out, perhaps the answer is that in those
instances the corporation should not be accorded such right, or should hold only a
limited right.
In addition, a major benefit of the approach would be at least using a
consistent method rather than an ad hoc one that has meant that sometimes the
Court has accorded a right to corporations without explanation or with oscillating
conceptions of the corporation. A consistent test would bolster the transparency of
the Court’s decision-making and its institutional legitimacy in this controversial
area of the law.
VI. CONCLUSION
Drawing on the relevant historical, theoretical, and doctrinal background, this
Article demonstrates that the doctrine of corporate personhood should not be
understood as a justification or methodology for granting corporations any
particular right. Instead, the doctrine merely recognizes that corporations can hold
rights as a means of protecting the rights of humans involved in them. This is an
important principle, but a distinctly limited one. It recognizes that corporations are
human endeavors capable of holding rights, but does not explain which rights they
have or how to make this determination.
In addition, the Article proposes that courts should use a pragmatic approach
for determining the scope of corporate rights rather than current ad hoc
approaches. Courts should grant corporations a particular constitutional right only
when doing so would serve the purpose of that right. Courts do not have to use a
substitute metaphor or unifying view of the corporation for a functional analysis
that considers the rights at stake and the people involved. Indeed, this Article has
offered a critical view of the Supreme Court’s conceptions of the corporation and
the use of metaphors in corporate rights determinations. These insights may add an
important dimension to ongoing discussions about constitutional rights in the
context of corporations and contribute to a theoretical framework for better
understanding the constitutional treatment of corporations.

anti-distortion rationale on the basis that it could be used to ban the political speech of
media corporations. Id. at 905–06.

